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ABSTRACT
Cases are won and lost in discovery, yet discovery draws little
academic attention. Most scholarship focuses on how much discovery
to allow, not on how courts decide discovery disputes—which, unlike
trials, occur in most cases. The growth of computer data—e-mails,
lingering deleted files, and so forth—increased discovery cost, but the
new e-discovery rules just reiterate existing cost-benefit
proportionality limits that draw broad consensus among litigation
scholars and economists. But proportionality rules are impossible to
apply effectively; they fail to curb discovery excess yet disallow
discovery that meritorious cases need. This Article notes
proportionality’s flaws but rejects the consensus blaming bad
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rulemaking or judging. Rather, proportionality requires impossible
comparisons between discovery value and cost before parties gather
the evidence. Like other arguments that procedural rulings should
depend on case merits, this Article notes how discovery has more
probative value in close cases—yet a case’s merits are unclear during
discovery because the court cannot yet examine all the evidence.
In game theory terms, parties with discovery disputes cannot
convey case merit credibly; courts have too little information, so lowmerit parties can claim high merit, and courts are compelled to act as
if all cases of a similar type warrant similar discovery. In this “pooling
equilibrium,” ruling the same on all cases in the “pool,” regardless of
merit, is courts’ best strategy but a suboptimal one, yielding too much
discovery in low-merit cases, too little in higher-merit ones. Thus, the
quest for better discovery has disappointed not because of bad rules
or decisions, but because courts and parties are stuck in a pooling
equilibrium with information-timing circularity: optimal evidence
gathering requires merits analysis, which in turn requires evidence
gathering.
As a solution, courts could defer close decisions on possibly useful
but costly evidence until meritorious cases separate from the pool,
turning pooling into separating equilibria. Summary judgment can be
this separation: cases going to trial after summary judgment not only
have higher average merit than the pool of all filed cases, but are
disproportionately likely to be the sort of close calls in which juries
struggle to reach verdicts. No one yet has proposed post–summary
judgment discovery to redress the costly discovery dilemma because
summary judgment typically occurs only after all discovery, but highcost evidence can be an exception to that usual sequence: cases
surviving summary judgment are close calls warranting more fact
gathering, so some costly discovery regularly denied should be
allowed after summary judgment. Thus, the existing debate is too
focused on limiting the amount of discovery; it should instead focus
more on timing costly discovery optimally, to try to limit discovery to
cases in which it is truly needed. Existing rules give courts discretion
to use this proposal, but a new rule could minimize the risk of
misusing the proposal to deny more discovery. This Article concludes
by briefly noting how economic analyses must consider the details
and information timing of the litigation process.
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INTRODUCTION
Most litigators agree that “discovery . . . is the battleground
1
where civil suits are won and lost.” “It is in discovery that the facts
are developed,” sometimes leading to a dismissal of the case on
2
summary judgment but other times to “vital evidence” that yields a
3
trial win or a “favorable settlement[].” Discovery’s cost attests to its
importance: in federal cases, discovery comprises half of all litigation
costs; in the most expensive 5 percent of cases, discovery amounts to
90 percent of litigation cost and totals 32 percent of the amount in
4
controversy. Yet on no other topic is there more disconnect between

1. Joseph D. Steinfield & Robert A. Bertsche, Recent Developments in the Law of Access
– 1998, 540 PLI/PAT. 53, 107 (1998); see also Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85
(2d Cir. 1990) (“Because employers rarely leave a paper trail—or ‘smoking gun’—[of]
discriminatory intent, . . . plaintiffs often must build their cases from pieces of circumstantial
evidence which cumulatively undercut the [defendant’s] credibility . . . . [R]efusal to compel
[discovery] . . . deprived Hollander of evidence potentially helpful to . . . assembl[ing] such a
quantum of circumstantial evidence . . . .” (citations omitted)); Jon W. Green & Kyle M.
Francis, Age Discrimination in Employment: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 522 PLI/LIT. 227, 238
(1995) (“Discovery is the most crucial phase of age discrimination actions.”).
2. Steinfield & Bertsche, supra note 1, at 107.
3. Green & Francis, supra note 1, at 238.
4. Thomas W. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 544–46, 548–49 (1998) (noting
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the academy and bar; discovery controversies often are “not
something that law professors pay a lot of attention to, but lawyers
5
do.” Although discovery is the topic of numerous bar publications
6
and conferences, it draws far fewer academic articles than hotter civil
7
8
rights issues, even though discovery is crucial to civil rights litigation.
Most of the limited academic writing focuses on how much discovery
is too much for parties to request, at least without paying more of the
9
production cost. Academics rarely focus on how courts decide
discovery disputes (which, unlike trials, occur in most lawsuits),
frustrating judges and parties alike. More academic focus is critical; if
cases are won and lost in discovery, then they are really won and lost
in discovery decisions.
The difficulty of discovery decisions took on a new salience once
10
computerization brought litigation into a “brave new world” of
costly “e-discovery” in which much evidence (perhaps 90 percent of
11
corporate data) is digital, not paper, and in which the best evidence
12
can be e-mail sent in unguarded moments or still-lingering “deleted”

also that only 15 percent of cases had no discovery, and 46 percent of those still had informal
evidence exchange).
5. Richard Marcus, Assoc. Reporter, Fed. Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules, Comment at the American Association of Law Schools 2008 Meeting, Section on Civil
Procedure (Jan. 4, 2008).
6. For example, the Practicing Law Institute’s annual conference, Electronic Discovery
and Retention Guidance for Corporate Counsel, yields a lengthy symposium issue. See
Symposium, Electronic Discovery and Retention Guidance for Corporate Counsel 2007, 766
PLI/LIT. 13 (2007) (17 articles); Symposium, Electronic Discovery and Retention Guidance for
Corporate Counsel 2006, 747 PLI/LIT. 9 (2006) (13 articles); Symposium, Electronic Discovery
and Retention Guidance for Corporate Counsel 2005, 733 PLI/LIT. 9 (2005) (14 articles).
7. An ExpressO search of top fifty law school specialty reviews found thirteen on
women’s or gender issues, seven on constitutional or civil rights, and only one on litigation.
8. For a discussion on the need for discovery to prove hidden discriminatory intent
circumstantially, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the proposals to limit discovery and cost-shifting proposals, see infra
Parts I.B, II.A.
10. Patricia A. Bronte, Managing Electronic Discovery Successfully in Insurance Coverage
Litigation, 758 PLI/LIT. 55, 75 (2007) (arguing for attorneys to “master the brave new world of
electronic discovery”); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World
or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 634 (2006).
11. Harvey L. Kaplan, Electronic Discovery in the 21st Century: Is Help on the Way?, 733
PLI/LIT. 65, 67 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Siemens Solar Indus. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 93 Civ. 1126 (LAP), 1994 WL
86368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994) (recounting the plaintiff’s discovery of e-mails “reveal[ing]
beyond peradventure” that the defendant praised its new product yet knew it “was not
commercially viable”).
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13

incriminating files. In 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
clarified that “electronically stored information” (“ESI”) is
discoverable unless it is “not reasonably accessible because of undue
14
burden or cost.” The “reasonably accessible” limit reflects worry
about e-discovery’s “enormous costs . . . becoming the single most
15
expensive facet of litigation.” The cost of e-discovery has two key
components: (1) quantity—with businesses exchanging 2.5 trillion e16
mails annually, 2 million at a typical company, and with computer
17
files often remaining recoverable after deletion, the amount of
attorney time needed to review discovery, and the potential for
discovery disputes, has increased; and (2) inaccessibility—digital data
“can be expensive or virtually impossible to recover” due to
“outmoded storage media and software, and dispersion of
18
information.” Because e-discovery can cost tens or hundreds of
19
thousands of dollars in even fairly typical cases, “[i]t is hard to
overstate the importance and the degree of anxiety generated by
electronic discovery . . . . It is not just in the world of big business; it is
20
in the world of organizations generally, large data producers.”
Yet this brave new world may not be so new. Applying old
21
litigation rules “to new technology presents additional challenges,”
but “this is not the first time someone has argued that the discovery
22
rules are no longer suitable for . . . contemporary discovery.” After
all, when the federal rules were enacted, “[t]he photocopy machine

13. See Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of PayPer-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1409–12 (2000) (recounting examples of these sorts of
digital evidence).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). For the details of these amendments, see infra note 74.
15. Bronte, supra note 10, at 59; see also Christopher S. Rugaber, E-Documents Subject to
Stricter Storage, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 2, 2006, at 3D (noting that
companies pay e-discovery consultants over $1 billion a year and must have lawyers review email and “things more difficult to track, like digital photos . . . [on] cell phones and information
on removable memory cards”).
16. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 67.
17. Pulver, supra note 13, at 1409–12.
18. William R. Maguire, Current Developments in Federal Civil Discovery Practice: Setting
Reasonable Limits in the Digital Era, 754 PLI/LIT. 169, 175 (2007).
19. See infra notes 87–88.
20. Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (comments of Lee H. Rosenthal, J., United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas).
21. Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic
Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258 (Spring/Summer 2001).
22. Id. at 254.
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23

did not exist,” and like all new technologies, it solved some problems
but created new ones. As with the discovery-multiplying effect of
computers, “the volume of paper created grew enormously when
24
photocopies became ubiquitous.” At the same time, as one court
marveled in now-quaint terms, “the modern convenience of
photocopying
lessens . . . burdensome
transportation
of . . .
25
documents,” just as computers can make document exchange as easy
26
as e-mailing attachments.
Because e-discovery is just another instance of an old problem—
technology increases costs by permitting more discovery—just as
27
photocopiers led to cost-benefit proportionality limits on discovery,
computers led to similar limits. The resulting e-discovery rules
paralleled existing proportionality rules, asking courts to balance
whether good cause justifies e-discovery that imposes a high “burden
28
or cost.” Such proportionality limits long have been prescribed by
law and economics scholars—not just the economists most skeptical
of litigation cost, runaway tort liability, and extortionate settlements,
but also others proposing cost-benefit requirements that force parties
29
to pay more of the cost of seeking heavy discovery. With contrary
views relegated to the periphery of the economic debate, discovery
limits are a topic of unusual consensus among civil procedure
scholars, economists, and the judicial and other governmental bodies
that repeatedly undertake rule changes and other efforts to rein in
30
discovery.
Dissenting from the consensus, this Article contends that
proportionality limits cannot be implemented effectively. Sometimes
23. Id. at 266.
24. Id.
25. Lemberger v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 76-C-552(JW), 1976 WL 834, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 1976).
26. See Richard Allan Horning, Electronically Stored Evidence: Answers to Some Recurring
Questions Concerning Pretrial Discovery and Trial Usage, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1335, 1344
(1984) (“[D]uplicati[ng] electronic data is relatively inexpensive . . . compared with the cost of
re-inputing . . . .”).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). For a discussion of this proportionality rule, see
infra Part I.A.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). For a discussion of this e-discovery rule, see infra Part I.A.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. For a discussion of the proportionality amendments and reform efforts, including
efforts by U.S. attorneys general, that preceded them, see infra notes 42–43. For a discussion of
the Manual for Complex Litigation proposals published by Federal Judicial Center, see infra
notes 49–51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the e-discovery amendments, see infra
notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
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they do too little, failing to curb discovery excess or allowing costly
discovery on meritless claims; other times they do too much,
disallowing discovery that meritorious cases need. These opposing
errors do not average out any more than it is on average comfortable
to have one foot frozen and one foot on fire. Additionally, when
product quality is hard to determine, bad products drive good ones
31
out of the market; analogously, if bad cases get too much discovery
and good cases too little, court dockets will have more bad cases and
fewer good cases. Consequently, suboptimal discovery skews the mix
of cases.
After noting how proportionality rules have disappointed at
regulating discovery and how e-discovery rules seem headed for a
similar fate, this Article parts company with those blaming bad
32
rulemaking or judges too timid to curb discovery. Rather, the
problem is that proportionality rules ask the impossible: judges must
decide when discovery cost is proportional to some measure of
“value” that includes both evidence value to jury deliberation and case
value to the parties and society. This yields a fundamental
information-timing problem: discovery disputes occur before parties
marshal all the evidence, so how can courts measure the value of
particular evidence, much less case merits? Like other arguments that
litigation procedure rulings cannot truly be independent of case
33
merits, this Article notes how discovery has more probative value in
close-call cases than in the strongest and weakest cases (in which
more evidence is less likely to affect case outcome). Case merits,
though critical to discovery decisions, typically remain hidden in a
cloud of uncertainty during discovery because the court is not yet able
to sift fully through the evidence and arguments.
This Article applies economics and game theory to analyze
courts’ decisions on litigation discovery disputes. Due to the
information costs (including time) of assessing case merit during
discovery, courts often cannot tell which plaintiffs’ braggadocio is
cheap talk and which reflects real case merit. As a result, courts must
ignore parties’ merits arguments and adjudicate discovery disputes as
if all cases of a similar type in the pool (that is, cases arising under the
same statute that are neither facially frivolous nor obvious winners)
warrant similar discovery. In game theory terms, courts’ discovery
31. See infra Part II.B.3.c.
32. See infra Part II.B.3.c.
33. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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rulings should be based on claims’ merit, but merit cannot be
communicated effectively; as a result, those rulings must be based on
the average value of all cases in the pool. In this pooling equilibrium,
the best available strategy for courts is to rule the same on all cases in
a pool regardless of case merit—even though these rulings are
suboptimal in the sense of yielding too much discovery in low-merit
cases and too little discovery in high-merit cases.
Under this analysis, the quest for better discovery limits has
disappointed not because of bad decisionmaking or bad rulemaking,
but because courts and parties are stuck in a pooling equilibrium. This
is a fundamental information-timing problem inherent in the
discovery stage of litigation: optimal evidence-gathering decisions
require more merits analysis, but merits analyses require more
evidence gathering. As in the folk song, “There’s a Hole in the
Bucket”—in which the hole is fixable only with a machine requiring
34
water poured from the broken bucket —the problem is a classic
circularity; the problem prevents the solution.
Deferring close decisions on potentially useful but costly
evidence until case merit is clearer—until meritorious cases
distinguish themselves, turning a pooling equilibrium into a
separating equilibrium—is one possible solution to the pooling
equilibrium. Fortunately, litigation has such a point: after summary
judgment. A case reaching trial, having survived summary judgment,
has a reasonable probability of merit: even without adopting the old
theory that tried cases have fifty-fifty odds, cases reaching trial are
more likely than others to be close calls, and they certainly have
higher average merit than the pool of all filed complaints. More
evidence, like costly electronic data, has more value to the jury in
close-call cases than in very weak or strong cases.
Accordingly, much of the scholarly debate on discovery misses
the mark by focusing on how much to limit costly discovery, such as
35
with proportionality rules and numerical caps. This Article suggests
focusing on when in litigation to allow costly discovery. Specifically,

34. Harry Belafonte and Odetta are probably the most famous pair to have sung this duet.
HARRY BELAFONTE, A MAN AND HIS MUSIC (RCA Records 1990) (track 5). The author first
heard it sung by muppets on The Muppet Show in the 1970s but, sadly, cannot find a video clip
or proper citation.
35. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 256 (“The retrenchment effort . . . . [has] two
themes . . . the principle of proportionality and quantitative limits . . . .”). For a discussion of
rules applying proportionality and numerical limits, see infra notes 43, 122 and accompanying
text.
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decisions regarding costly discovery should be postponed until after
summary judgment, to ensure that costly discovery is imposed only in
cases with a greater probability of merit. Although this proposal
might enable judges to deny or postpone more discovery, any
discovery denied or postponed under this proposal is probably
already denied based on judges’ proportionality discretion. Thus, the
main utility of this proposal would be to explain how courts could
allow more discovery, only after summary judgment, of helpful but
costly evidence that courts often disallow and declare
nondiscoverable.
Nobody has suggested solving the dilemma of costly discovery
with post–summary judgment discovery, which might seem to be a
36
counterintuitive idea; summary judgment typically comes only after
all discovery is completed. Unusually costly evidence should be an
exception: surviving summary judgment means a case likely is the sort
of close call warranting more fact gathering, so courts should allow
truly costly discovery, like the heavy e-discovery that they commonly
37
disallow, only once a case survives summary judgment.
Interestingly, no rule change is required to implement this
Article’s proposal that courts revisit denials of burdensome discovery
if a case survives summary judgment. Existing rules give courts broad
case management authority, including power over the extent and
sequence of discovery and summary judgment. Thus, this proposal
could not only improve litigation discovery, but also provide a
welcome answer to courts’ riddle of how to rule on proportionality
without circular, premature case-merit evaluations. A new rule would
be advisable, though, to minimize the risk of courts misusing the
proposal to deny discovery excessively.
This Article’s conclusion then offers a brief broader point about
economic analysis. Fitting into a line of scholarship analyzing
litigation as a series of points in time when information emerges, this
Article suggests that for economic analysis of litigation to provide
accurate diagnoses and useful recommendations, it must do more

36. The exception is that courts allow prediscovery limited-scope summary judgment
motions in certain cases, such as those limited to governmental immunity defenses. See infra
note 199 and accompanying text.
37. This Article does not discuss all discovery reforms, just one problem that cannot be
fully fixed (the impossibility of optimal discovery decisions) and a partial fix well targeted to
that information-timing problem (postponing some discovery until summary judgment). For a
discussion of other proposals, such as discovery sampling or cost shifting, see infra notes 218–24
and accompanying text.
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than just prescribe cost-benefit comparisons; it must consider the
timing-and-stages nature of litigation, such as by delving into the
details of discovery, prelitigation settlement, and other events short of
trials and dispositive motions.
I. THE RISE OF PROPORTIONALITY LIMITS ON LITIGATION
DISCOVERY—AND THEIR DISAPPOINTING RESULTS
A. What Is Old Is New Again: Proportionality Requirements as a
Solution to Tech-Driven Discovery Excess
The most surprising aspect of the e-discovery rules is how unnew
those rules are. This is not the first time new rules have targeted
discovery excesses that new technology facilitated. The federal rules
38
long have prescribed “liberal discovery” that the producing party
39
must pay for itself and a broad relevance standard—that
discoverable evidence need not be admissible, only “reasonably
40
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” These
principles arose in an older, prephotocopier era, when typical
41
discovery was just on-premises review of original evidence.
Like the computer revolution, the older photocopier revolution
facilitated the higher levels of discovery that still exist—massive
document demands and “paper dump” responses—prompting a
powerful countermovement at the highest levels of the legal
establishment, including the U.S. attorney general and an American

38. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (disallowing the
prediscovery dismissal of a discrimination claim because the federal rules’ “simplified notice
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions . . . to
dispose of unmeritorious claims”).
39. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“[T]he presumption
is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests . . . .”).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351 (noting that
discovery relevance “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the
case”).
41. The early discovery decisions following the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure illustrate this limited nature of early-to-mid–twentieth century discovery. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Sunset Oil Co., 2 F.R.D. 93, 93 (W.D. Wash. 1941) (ordering documents produced “at
[parties’] respective places of business during reasonable office hours”); Compagnie
Continentale D’Importation v. Pac. Argentine Braz. Line, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1940) (“[Document] inspection should be held at defendant’s convenience . . . at its place of
business.”); Gielow v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 425, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)
(ordering party “to exhibit the documents . . . but at the office of the complainant; not to be
removed therefrom”).
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Bar Association “Special Committee on Abuse of Discovery.” The
federal judges on the Judicial Conference ultimately enacted the
proportionality rule requiring that discovery
shall be limited by the court . . . [if] the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources,
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
43
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.

The sense of urgency behind proportionality limits has not
dissipated; the Supreme Court in 1998 “signalled the importance of
the proportionality concept in some cases by quoting portions of Rule
26(b)(2) and observing that ‘[it] vests the trial judge with broad
44
discretion to tailor discovery narrowly.’”
The timing of the earlier proportionality movement is striking:
coming in the 1980s and 1990s, it shortly preceded the widespread
adoption in the 1990s and 2000s of e-mail, networked computers, and
the Internet. To be sure, although computers were less ubiquitous
45
46
before the 1990s, major companies and government entities long
have computerized their data. But courts often ignored cost-based
objections to computer discovery, blaming computer-using parties for
“a system of record-keeping which conceals rather than discloses
relevant records, or makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate

42. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1332 (1978) (noting that the Judicial Conference
and American Bar Association Committee had the “primary concern . . . [of] curbing the cost of
discovery and reducing the ways discovery can be abused”); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery
Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 753–68 (1998) (recounting drives to limit discovery);
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 744–45 (1998) (discussing the proportionality
amendments that later became part of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
44. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2008.1, at 54 (2d ed. Supp. 2008) (quoting Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)).
45. See, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestern Indemn., 88 F.R.D. 191, 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(granting the plaintiffs, who had claimed a widespread “pattern or practice” of discrimination, a
search that could take thousands of hours of the defendant’s “computer systems, including
access to and information about . . . equipment, raw data, programs, data management systems,
and the by-products of their analyses”).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Greenlee, 380 F. Supp. 652, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (denying a
criminal defendant a requested weeks-long search of Internal Revenue Service computers that
would have created risks of security breaches, privacy violations, and “serious interruption of
the operations of the IRS”).
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them” and thereby rejecting parties’ “impossibility contentions
insofar as they are grounded in the peculiar manner in which [they]
47
maintain their computer systems.”
When computer discovery was a rarity, courts could ignore its
cost. Once it was common, courts faced the reality of tactical demands
for costly searches. As in the 1970s, technology raised discovery cost
48
and volume, inspiring efforts to limit discovery. The Manual for
Complex Litigation in 1995 recommended “a cost-benefit approach”
49
to stop “fishing expedition[s],” proposing “conditioning particular
50
discovery on payment of its costs by the party seeking it”; the
Manual did not detail as broad a range of relevant factors as did later
e-discovery proposals, but it did stress that with discovery costs
increasing, courts should give renewed consideration to cost-shifting
51
options that had not previously been in wide use.
Yet not all courts have followed the Manual for Complex
52
Litigation, and one later case quickly became the leading word on e53
discovery. In 2003, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I) set
out a multifactor test to determine whether discovery should be
allowed or denied, partially allowed, or allowed conditioned upon
54
cost shifting. The Zubulake I test essentially was a more detailed
cost-benefit analysis comparing the costs and benefits of discovering
55
the disputed evidence, with cost evaluated in light of the parties’
resources, the amount in controversy, and the “relative ability of each
47. Dunn, 88 F.R.D. at 198.
48. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infra notes 87–88.
49. Pulver, supra note 13, at 1386.
50. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.433 (1995).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 94 C 897, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1995) (mem.) (granting class action plaintiffs’
motion to compel the defendant to produce computer-stored e-mail at the defendant’s own
expense, estimated at $50,000 to $70,000, and expressly rejecting an alternative suggested by the
Manual of Complex Litigation).
53. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Judge
Scheindlin, who authored Zubulake I, issued several later relevant opinions: Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC (Zubulake II), 230 F.R.D. 290, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
54. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322.
55. Id. Factors focusing on the benefit of discovering the benefit include the following:
“The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;” “The
availability of such information from other sources;” “The importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation;” and “The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.” Id.
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56

party to control costs.” Zubulake I never fully harmonized ediscovery law and practice, however. Not qualifying as “final” orders,
57
discovery rulings ordinarily are nonappealable, so “few trial court
decisions regarding the scope and logistics of discovery . . . [reach] the
58
appellate level.” Because Zubulake I and virtually all e-discovery
opinions are nonbinding district court precedent, Zubulake I, though
59
“widely regarded as the leading case authority” on e-discovery, has
60
not drawn universal adherence.
Also helpful are the e-discovery reform proposals of the
nongovernmental Sedona Conference Working Group on Best
61
Practices for Electronic Document Production. Sedona paralleled
the Manual for Complex Litigation and Zubulake I on some points,
62
such as the permissibility of cost shifting, but it added other
56. Id.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (authorizing appeal only of “final decisions” in cases); see also,
e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992) (“As a general
rule, a district court’s order enforcing a discovery request is not a ‘final order’ subject to
appellate review. A party that seeks to present an objection to a discovery order immediately to
a court of appeals must refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt
order.”).
58. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation:
Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 378 (2000).
59. Benjamin D. Silbert, Note, The 2006 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure:
Accessible and Inaccessible Electronic Information Storage Devices, Why Parties Should Store
Electronic Information in Accessible Formats, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 18 (2007),
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article14.pdf.
60. See, e.g., Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004
WL 1553480, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (ordering cost shifting to requesting party even
though Zubulake I “weighs against shifting any expense” because “Zubulake is a district court
opinion without binding authority”); Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 24 (comments of James
C. Francis IV, J., United States District Court for the Southern District of New York)
(discussing use of multifactor tests in e-discovery disputes and arguing that “it depends on
whether you adopt Judge Scheindlin’s view [in Zubulake] of a hierarchy or whether you
think . . . [the] factors will probably play out differently in different cases. I am resistant to the
hierarchy approach because my fear is that the factor at the top of the hierarchy will almost
always wash out the other[s]”).
61. WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., SEDONA
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS &
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (2d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter SEDONA], available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/
TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf. Sedona produced a draft in 2003, revised it after public
comment in 2004, updated it minimally in 2005, and produced a 2007 Second Edition
incorporating the 2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules. See THOMAS Y. ALLMAN,
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES AFTER THE FEDERAL AMENDMENTS: THE SECOND EDITION (2007),
at 1 n.3, 2–3 (2007), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/2007Summaryof
SedonaPrinciples2ndEditionAug17assentforWG1.pdf.
62. SEDONA, supra note 61, at 67.
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proposals focused on the technical details of electronic data. For
example, Sedona distinguished certain data types as presumptively
discoverable or not, like “active data” (ordinary files) and backup or
63
deleted “legacy data” accessible only at high cost. It also proposed
certain best practices for e-discovery, most notably that “[d]iscovery
requests for electronically stored information . . . be as clear as
64
65
possible.” Zubulake I cited Sedona’s early work, and a subsequent
report authored by a Sedona editor notes that courts have cited its
66
earlier work, “helping provide de facto ‘national standards.’” Yet
courts have not adopted Sedona wholesale; one topic Sedona
addressed heavily, preservation of data, was “relegated . . . to
evolving case law” because the e-discovery rules authors would not
67
enact preservation standards.
Moreover, Zubulake I and Sedona, although thoughtful and
useful guides to e-discovery, promise limited impact. They do not aim
for a paradigm shift, instead relying on status-quo methods to limit
discovery. Like Zubulake I, Sedona accepted as its touchstone the old
“‘proportionality’ standard” of assessing costs “in light of the nature
68
of the litigation and the amount in controversy.” Sedona rejected
other ideas, like Texas’s mandatory cost shifting (making requesting
parties pay for e-discovery not “reasonably available” in the
69
“ordinary course” of business ) in favor of a merely permissive
70
suggestion that cost “‘may’ (instead of ‘should’)” be shifted.
Zubulake I likewise said courts should order cost shifting only for
“relatively inaccessible [data], such as in backup tapes” that are costly
71
to recover, and “close calls should be resolved in favor of the

63. “Active data is typically stored on local hard drives, networked servers, and distributed
devices or offline archival sources from which information can be accessed without a special
restoration effort.” ALLMAN, supra note 61, at 6–7. “Information stored solely for disasterrecovery purposes, ‘legacy’ data retained in obsolete systems, and deleted or fragmentary
information that can be restored only through extraordinary efforts” ordinarily are “unduly
burdensome and costly to access.” Id. at 5.
64. Id. at 25.
65. E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 n.61, 321 n.67
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
66. ALLMAN, supra note 61, at 2.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 5.
69. TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4.
70. ALLMAN, supra note 61, at 9.
71. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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72

presumption” against cost shifting, with cost shifting denied if
73
evidence is sufficiently useful.
74
The 2006 Federal Rules amendments followed at least the spirit
of Zubulake I and Sedona in stressing cost-benefit proportionality
75
limits : when digital or electronically stored information is “not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost . . . the court
may nonetheless order discovery . . . if the requesting party shows
76
good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C),” the
proportionality rule. The Advisory Committee’s notes to these new
rules built on Zubulake I and other case law by prescribing an
essentially similar cost-benefit analysis instructing courts to look to
various factors relevant to the likely benefit and cost of a disputed
77
discovery request.

72. Id. at 320.
73. See id. at 322 (noting factors such as the “extent to which the request is specifically
tailored to discover relevant information . . . [and] [t]he relative benefits to the parties of
obtaining the information”); see also AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444
(2007) (“Defendant shall bear the costs of restoration of the initial sample of back-up tapes and
screening the sample to identify responsive documents. The parties will then have an
opportunity to argue . . . [whether] additional restoration of back-up tapes is likely to lead to
production of relevant evidence and consequently who should bear the cost . . . .”).
74. Three rules primarily control e-discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring
initial disclosures to give locations of documents and “electronically stored information” (ESI));
id. 34(a)(1)(A) (deeming ESI part of “document” demands and allowing ESI testing or
sampling); id. 34(b) (allowing parties to “specify the form . . . in which electronically stored
information is to be produced,” with default rule that ESI be produced as “ordinarily
maintained” or in form “reasonably usable”); id. 45 (allowing ESI discovery from nonparties).
75. See Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 9–10 (comments of Lee H. Rosenthal, J., United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas) (explaining that it is “clear that the key
is proportionality” in the new e-discovery rule, because its “good cause determination must be
based on the proportionality limits that [already] have been in the rules”).
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
77. Id. 26 advisory committee’s note. According to the Advisory Committee,
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the discovery request;
(2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources;
(3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is
no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding
relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily
accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further
information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the
parties’ resources.
Id.
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B. The E-Discovery Rules: Just More Disappointingly Conventional
and Ineffective Proportionality Limits
With the 2006 e-discovery rules following earlier proposals by
the Manual for Complex Litigation, Zubulake I and other district
78
courts, the Sedona Group, and academic writings, the rules evolved
in a highly decentralized fashion. Decentralization, though chaotic,
often has the virtue of yielding a flourish of creative, varied
independent efforts. Oddly, the major proposals to limit technologyinspired discovery proliferation since the 1970s have been similar,
even derivative, cost-benefit proportionality rules; at best, these
proposals contain a mild, permissive suggestion of cost shifting in the
79
rarest, most costly discovery situations.
But the main problem with proportionality limits on discovery is
not that they are old news. Rather, the problem is that such limits
never have worked terribly well and appear unlikely to work well for
e-discovery. Although the idea of proportionality has gained
momentum for decades, led by powerful forces in the judiciary and
the bar, proportionality is widely criticized as having been ineffective
at convincing judges to rein in discovery excess. “Whatever the
theoretical possibilities,” the proportionality rule “created only a
ripple in the caselaw,” a leading civil procedure treatise notes; “no
80
radical shift has occurred.”
Even if the proportionality rule did not yield a major shift, courts
do deny discovery for cost reasons. To be sure, some plaintiffs get
81
very broad discovery; Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., for
example, allowed discovery of all prior defective-product complaints
over pleas that the discovery would require a costly search of
82
voluminous records. The court explained that “most courts have

78. See, e.g., Horning, supra note 26, at 1344 (proposing that courts more often require
production of digital rather than paper data, as well as that courts more often allow requesting
parties to require that producing parties put that data into specific forms and facilitate
interpretation of complex data); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 615–18 (2001) (proposing more cost shifting to parties requesting
costly e-discovery); Pulver, supra note 13, at 1386 (same).
79. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
80. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 44, § 2008.1, at 121; see also Ronald J. Hedges, A View
from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 127 (2005) (“[T]he proportionality principle of
Rule 26(b)(2) . . . is not being utilized by judges . . . .”).
81. Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976).
82. Id. at 76–77.
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held that the existence and nature of other complaints in product
liability cases is a proper subject for pre-trial discovery,” and it would
be unfair “[t]o allow a defendant whose business generates massive
records to frustrate discovery by creating an inadequate filing system,
83
and then claiming undue burden.”
But however persuasive Kozlowski’s logic, its permissiveness
with costly discovery is the exception, not the rule. Courts often
disallow discovery on relevant matters for reasons of cost, burden,
and inconvenience, such as in decisions denying plaintiffs’ requests
for discovery on similar instances of misconduct in claims of
84
85
discrimination or other wrongdoing; courts similarly have rejected
defendants’ efforts to discover information a government agency used
86
to enact a disputed regulation. As to e-discovery in particular, the

83. Id. at 75–76.
84. See, e.g., Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 477–78 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding, in
claims of racially discriminatory failure to promote and hostile work environment, a ruling that
“discovery must be limited, in both its temporal and geographical reach,” to just complaints in
plaintiff’s department for one year, and that plaintiff could not obtain discovery of complaints at
all departments, despite the plaintiff’s argument that complaints “were contained in an easily
accessible, central database, and he experienced discrimination at the hands of other [university]
departments,” because the request was “unduly burdensome”); Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse
Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 317, 319, 320 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding, in claim of
“systematic elimination of older employees”, denial of discovery of statistical data, including
records of all employees defendant terminated over nine years, because of courts’ “‘substantial
discretion to curtail the expense and intrusiveness of discovery’ in limiting . . . broad discovery
of personnel files” (quoting Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994))); EEOC v.
D.C. Pub. Sch., 217 F.R.D. 12, 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying, in a claim of age discrimination in
the termination of a teacher during a reduction in force, a request for “teaching disciplines of
each teacher . . . [in the] academic year” when the plaintiff was terminated, when data was
“perhaps retrievable [only] from a search of every personnel file,” which “would be
oppressive”); Lee v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying
a race discrimination plaintiff’s requests as to all employees “disciplined but not terminated
for . . . time card infractions” (plaintiff’s alleged offense) over five years, when discovery “would
require extensive searches of files outside of the locations” plaintiff worked); Aramburu v.
Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434, 1442–44 (D. Kan. 1995) (denying a race and disability
discrimination plaintiff discovery that would take 240 hours to procure 1,500 personnel files,
because the “plaintiff’s need for the information” was “disproportionate” to the burden).
85. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Stewart, 220 F.R.D. 599, 602 (D. Ariz. 2004) (denying a motion to
compel discovery in a prisoner’s claim of denial of court-ordered medical care because of the
burden of “photocopying, organizing, and taking adequate measures to ensure prisoner
confidentiality for the previous thirteen years of prisoner complaints”); Green Constr. Co. v.
Kan. Power & Light Co., 732 F. Supp. 1550, 1554 (D. Kan. 1990) (denying a discovery request
that would have required examining “nearly 62,400 bond claims” because the discovery’s
relevance was outweighed by the burden of examining the bond claims, which lacked any
“index[ing] or filing code system”).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 392, 393 (M.D.N.C. 2003)
(denying the defendant, an energy company challenging an Environmental Protection Agency
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limited case law has been mixed, but given the level of angst about
costly e-discovery underlying these rules, they may be disappointing
87
to their advocates. Whatever the mix of decisions allowing and
88
disallowing costly e-discovery, however, a more fundamental
problem remains with both the original proportionality rule and the
e-discovery rules.
Although denying relevant discovery due to cost may be
defensible pragmatically, it is an unsatisfying concession that litigation
accuracy inevitably is limited due to the cost of finding and analyzing
evidence needed for accurate verdicts or settlements. Less accuracy is
troubling not only morally but economically. Failing to impose
liability on the guilty because evidence of guilt is too costly
insufficiently deters misconduct and insufficiently assures that parties

(EPA) air regulation, discovery from another federal agency whose “personnel may have been
present when some decisions were made by the EPA,” because although “statements and
positions taken by any EPA employee are relevant,” the “burden to the [plaintiff] far outweighs
the relevance”); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 208 F.R.D. 449, 454 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying
the plaintiff, in a suit against a federal agency for violating rules on issuing regulations, an order
for nonparty witnesses to produce documents regarding those regulations, when the court saw
the request as expensive and unduly burdensome).
87. Some cases allow costly e-discovery when justified by high case stakes. See, e.g., PSEG
Power NY, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *1, *9–10
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (mem.) (ordering the plaintiff, in a $4.4 million construction contract
claim, at cost the of $40,000 to $200,000, “to produce all electronically stored emails, numbering
approximately 3000, conjunctively with their corresponding attachments as ‘married’
documents”).
Other cases allow costly e-discovery despite modest case stakes when the information
appears valuable. For example, in W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D.
Mass. 2007), regarding a claim that an employee benefit administrator breached its fiduciary
duty, the court found that the data sought—thousands of employee claims stored electronically
as unindexed images—were “not reasonably accessible,” id. at 43, when it could cost $80,000
and 4,000 hours to recover 34,000 requested claim forms and medical bills, though plaintiff then
narrowed its request to 3,000 claims, id. at 41, 44. Yet even though the discovery was
burdensome and the “importance of the issues at stake” was low, the court allowed the
discovery because the information was “clearly an integral part of the litigation . . . not only to
BeneFirst’s culpability, but also to the amount of damages.” Id. at 44.
88. Courts also have denied, or denied unless plaintiffs paid the bulk of the cost, seemingly
high-relevance e-discovery, see, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (requiring class action harassment plaintiffs to pay 75 percent of a $249,000 email search for known pornographic and other harassing e-mails), and have denied costly
discovery even in high-stakes litigation in which the request seemed insufficiently essential, see,
e.g., Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 247 F.R.D. 567, 569–72 (D.
Minn. 2007) (denying, in a claim that landlords caused actual damages of $800,000, “enhanced
damages” for fraud, and “long-term economic impact” on parties’ relationship, defendants’
request for plaintiff’s database on other landlords’ lease charges, because data was not in
searchable format and required restoration, costing $124,000 plus $27,823 per month, and
defendant could compile the data from paper discovery).
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internalize costs (such as the costs of pollution) they impose on
89
others. Conversely, imposing liability on the innocent because
exculpatory evidence was too costly yields ill-targeted deterrence of
innocent activity; imposing pollution liability on a nonpolluting
90
business just disincentivizes that socially useful commerce.
Thus, proportionality rules can be criticized equally for allowing
entirely opposite errors, both false negatives (failing to detect and
halt discovery abuse) and false positives (finding disproportionate
some costly discovery that actually is justified by high evidentiary
value and case merit). Erroneous pro-plaintiff rulings unjustifiably
increase litigation costs and pressure defendants to settle
unmeritorious cases; conversely, erroneous pro-defendant rulings
91
deny plaintiffs the ability to press meritorious claims successfully.
If the e-discovery rules are likely to yield the sort of uninspiring
results seen after the original proportionality rule that so much of the
legal establishment demanded, the question becomes how powerful
forces attempting to respond to a hugely costly phenomenon have
proven so impotent for so long?

89. As to the economic value of litigation accuracy, see generally Louis Kaplow, The Value
of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399 (1973).
90. Posner, supra note 89, at 402–06, 410–15. Although discovery is most commonly
analyzed as a way plaintiffs get information from defendants, the opposite can be true as well.
Defendants can destroy plaintiffs’ claims by pressing them for the details of, and facts
supporting, their allegations; defendants also often press defenses that are based on the
plaintiff’s conduct (and thus that require the defendant to seek discovery from the plaintiff),
such as contributory negligence in tort cases, mitigation of damages in contract cases, and
evidence of other misconduct that would have justified a challenged firing in employment
discrimination cases.
91. Cf. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1287 (2002). As Professor Bone and Dr. Evans noted as to rulings on class
action certification,
Judges make mistakes. They grant certification when it should be denied, and they
deny certification when it should be granted. . . . An erroneous grant creates
unnecessary administrative and litigation costs and . . . unjustified settlements. An
erroneous denial adds to plaintiffs’ litigation costs and can make it harder for
plaintiffs to recover.
Id.
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II. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF WHY PROPORTIONALITY LIMITS,
THOUGH POPULAR, CANNOT BE OPTIMAL
A. The Consensus: Limit Discovery Based on Cost-Benefit
Proportionality Principles
For a field featuring so much controversy, discovery has featured
an odd degree of consensus among analysts in disparate fields.
Chicago School economists like Professor Richard Epstein, skeptical
of whether much litigation is worth the potential for high cost and
abuse, blame malleable balancing tests generally, including
“underregulated” discovery, for the “inexorable expansion of [tort]
92
liability.” Judge Frank Easterbrook, fretting about “impositional
(excessive, abusive)” discovery that induces settlement by imposing
93
high costs on defendants, advocates in part “limit[ing] discovery to
94
matters admissible at trial” —a drastic change from allowing any
discovery “relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” including
material that is inadmissible but “reasonably calculated to lead to . . .
95
admissible evidence.” Surprisingly, many non–Chicago School
economists have similar qualms about discovery. Professors Robert
Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld propose that after a “reasonable”
amount of discovery in a case, the cost of responding to discovery
96
requests should shift to the requesting party. Though disagreeing
with that proposal, Professor Bruce Hay notes how heavy discovery,
by scaring defendants into settling early, can counterproductively lead
97
to less, not more, disclosure of illegality.
There are dissenting voices criticizing the drive to narrow
discovery, often with arguments that limiting discovery favors
defendants over plaintiffs or that drives to limit discovery are

92. Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469, 476 (1987).
93. Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637, 644
n.26 (1989); see also Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 782, 809 (1986) (criticizing the “ability of a well-heeled or determined plaintiff to hound
a defendant in discovery”).
94. Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 644 n.26.
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
96. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 459 (1994); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New
Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 69–76 (1995). For other cost-shifting proposals, see supra note
78.
97. Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481,
510–14 (1994).
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premised on exaggerated fears of discovery abuse by plaintiffs.
Relatedly, there have been empirical findings that discovery excess
99
may be confined to exceptional cases. But those voices have been on
the periphery of the consensus in favor of more proportionality-based
limits on discovery—a consensus spanning (as this Section discusses)
civil proceduralists, economists, and the judges who have enacted rule
changes imposing new discovery limits since the 1970s.
Proportionality limits can be optimal, though, only if courts can
perform the needed economic cost-benefit analyses passably well.
What this Article seeks to add to the scholarship on the
proportionality rule is that courts cannot undertake the needed
analyses well—which means that discovery limits are doomed to be
suboptimal.
B. An Economic View of Discovery: Helping Factfinders Assess Case
Value and Merit (L and p)—Which Makes Discovery
Decisionmaking Circular
The purpose of broad discovery, in economic terms, is well
established: “[a] full exchange of the information . . . enabl[es] each
party to form a more accurate, and generally therefore a more
100
convergent, estimate of the likely [case] outcome.” The case law
101
uses similar logic to justify broad discovery. This Article focuses not
only on how discovery helps parties assess cases, but also on how
judges decide discovery disputes—a matter more rarely analyzed in

98. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1396 (1994) [hereinafter Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray]; Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 685 (1998); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery
“Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 252 (Spring/Summer 2001) (arguing against 1990sera discovery rules amendments “constricting the availability of information and continuing the
late twentieth-century evolution favoring defendants over plaintiffs”).
99. See Willging et al., supra note 4, at 547 n.34 (noting that discovery cost is unusually high
in the costliest 5 percent of cases); see also Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 98, at
1397, 1432–42 (reviewing a number of empirical studies and finding “a surprisingly low
incidence of discovery in federal civil litigation”).
100. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 571 (6th ed. 2003); see also
ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 203 (2003)
(characterizing discovery similarly).
101. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”).
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102

economic terms. Such judicial decisionmaking draws little academic
attention, probably because almost all discovery decisions are
103
unappealable district court decisions and because only experienced
litigators recognize that if cases are won and lost in discovery, they
really are won and lost in litigating discovery motions, dueling motions
104
105
to compel discovery and for protective orders.
A court must undertake a cost-benefit analysis to decide, as the
rules require, whether the value of particular discovery is
proportional to its cost (both dollar cost and nonpecuniary burdens).
It must assess the cost of finding and producing the evidence, and it
must compare that cost to the benefit of having that evidence.
Assessing cost often is feasible; parties litigating discovery regularly
106
detail the time and dollar costs of producing disputed evidence.
Assessing the benefit of particular discovery is the tricky part. As
this Section discusses, for truly accurate judicial decisionmaking, a
court must consider not only the probative value of the particular
evidence and the size of the case (as the rules command), but also—
contrary to the conventional wisdom on discovery decisionmaking—
the likelihood that the case is meritorious, that the plaintiff will
prevail at trial. In economic terms, the court’s proportionality
determination bases on the following three variables:
• L, the size of the case, typically the amount in controversy but
also possibly the value of nonmonetary relief;
• p, the probability that the plaintiff will win if the case goes to
trial; and
• Δp, the probative value of the evidence (the difference the
disputed evidence makes to p).

Yet, as this Section discusses, each of these three variables can be
difficult or impossible for courts to assess during discovery. This
difficulty is why this Article offers a diagnosis of pessimism about

102. For one article that does undertake just such an analysis of a range of procedural
matters, including but not limited to discovery decisions, see Robert G. Bone, Who Decides?: A
Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1996–2000 (2007). Bone
analyzes procedural decisions based on a view of the judge as not an “umpire” but “a player in
the game” whose decisions interact with those of the parties’ to affect the course of litigation. Id.
103. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
105. See id. 26(c).
106. For a collection of cases in which parties detailed and argued before the court the costs
and burdens of responding to discovery requests, see supra notes 84–88.
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courts’ ability to make accurate proportionality decisions on
discovery disputes.
1. Size of Case (L): Difficult to Determine in Many Cases. Under
the proportionality rule, in assessing the likely benefit of discovery,
courts should take into account “the amount in controversy . . . [and]
107
importance of the issues at stake.” This makes economic sense;
discovery offers less benefit in low-value cases. More evidencegathering expense is justified in a case that might result in millions of
dollars changing hands; it is harder to justify similar evidence108
gathering expense in a small-claims dispute.
The “amount in controversy” (dollar value) and “importance of
the issues” (nonmonetary value), however, can be uncertain until
trial; plaintiffs often press claims that present a strong argument for
some amount of damages (such as recovery of out-of-pocket losses)
with a weaker claim for additional damages (such as punitive
109
110
damages). Worse, case value can be subjective; what is the value
of an injunction stopping seal clubbing, sexual harassment, or other
illegality? Courts do assign damages awards for complex,
111
nonpecuniary harms like torture. Still, it remains wholly subjective
whether evidence that might help win an injunction stopping seal
clubbing is proportional to a month-long, million-dollar data search.
With case value often subjective, one problem with
proportionality is “finding principled criteria for differentiating
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
108. One caveat: If there are many similar low-value claims, then discovery in any one such
case might be quite valuable, even if the claims are not aggregated into a class action, so long as
the information disclosure in one case yields benefits for the others similarly situated, either by
reducing other litigants’ discovery costs or by disclosing illegality before it occurs (and thereby
saving not only litigation cost, but also the cost of the illegality).
109. See Davis v. Ross, 107 F.R.D. 326, 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[P]lausible claims for
punitive damages can easily be made in many actions . . . . [T]he amount of damages will always
be in issue; plaintiff seeks one million dollars in compensatory damages, and evidence must be
introduced to demonstrate that the award should be more than nominal.” (emphasis omitted)).
110. See, e.g., Lyons v. Mobil Oil Corp., 554 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Conn. 1982) (holding that
the prevailing party wins attorneys’ fees unless it obtains only nominal damages because
“[i]njunctive relief is an important part of the [statutory] scheme . . . regardless of whether . . .
damages are awarded”); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 912 (1999) (“Assigning
values to substantive interests is both difficult and controversial. Reasonable people disagree,
for example, about the relative importance of the different interests protected by the
Constitution.”).
111. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (awarding damages in a
human rights class action).
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between various types of cases”; “[w]here . . . are judges expected to
find the criteria and analytical structure for making such judgments”
as whether more discovery is warranted on a high-dollar contract
claim than on a low-dollar discrimination claim for mainly injunctive
112
relief? These problems can be mitigated with rules of thumb as to
“the amount of discovery normally permissible in certain types of
113
cases” :
[A] search for discriminatory intent in a civil rights case may be seen
as involving constitutional values . . . [and] broader discovery . . .
than in a personal injury or commercial case. On the other hand,
judicial experience indicating that in certain civil rights cases . . .
further discovery is unlikely to shed additional light . . . might lead a
114
judge to place limits . . . .

Although “patterns of appropriate discovery . . . may emerge
which can normally be followed unless the particular facts warrant
115
116
otherwise,” “[o]bviously these judgments will not be easy.” Nor
will they be optimal; even the best rule of thumb treats cases similarly
117
despite relevant differences between them.
This difficulty estimating L is not the main topic of this Article’s
analysis, but the partial solution, assuming the same average value for
all cases in the same pool, returns in this Section as a similar
imperfect solution to the problem of estimating p, the probability that
the plaintiff would win at trial.

112. Edward F. Sherman & Stephen O. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80’s—
Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 276 (1982).
113. Id. at 279.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. I should not overstate the point; the relevant rules of thumb could be made as accurate
as possible by refining them for various subsets of cases. Cf. Bone, supra note 102, at 1996
(noting, as to various procedural matters for which judges might lack the information necessary
for accurate rulings, that “it is possible to find criteria, such as type of claim, amount in
controversy, number of parties, and so on, to sort different case types with reasonable clarity
and efficiency”). For example, rather than just say that employment discrimination cases are
fact intensive and thus warrant more discovery, the relevant rule of thumb could allow more
discovery in certain kinds of discrimination cases, such as incumbent employees’ termination
and promotion claims (which typically depend on detailed evaluations of years of employee
performance), but not rejected applicants’ claims (in which all the employer knew was the
applicant’s interview and paper application, not years of performance). Still, even the best rule
of thumb is just the best probabilistic generalization, one that yields suboptimal results in
nonconforming cases.
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2. Probative Value of the Evidence Sought (Δp): Difficult to
Assess before Fully Analyzing That and Other Evidence. The most
important consideration in a discovery dispute is the probative value
of the evidence—Δp, the difference (Δ) the evidence makes to the
probability (p) the plaintiff will win at trial. The proportionality rule
asks courts to assess the likely benefit of discovery, taking into
account “the needs of the case . . . and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues,” which are aspects of probative
118
119
value. Complexity of the issues, another proportionality factor,
also goes to probative value: in a simple case (that is, “did the
defendant sign the contract?”), more evidence has little probative
value. Rather, more evidence is most useful in cases about technical
120
121
matters, hidden intent, and so forth.
Yet courts may have difficulty discerning the probative value of
evidence before discovery of that evidence. Nobody knows in
advance what a witness will say in a deposition, making it difficult to
122
assess the probative value of going beyond the ten-deposition limit.
The same holds for searching computers or voluminous paper files:
the party opposing discovery will have to make its proportionality
cost-benefit argument before the search, so the court will not see the
fruits of the discovery before having to rule on discovery’s likely
123
benefit.
“In the absence of any information about [the] evidence,” Judge
Richard Posner noted in discussing how parties anticipate opposing
evidence, the only option is to “assume that such evidence . . . is of
124
average helpfulness.” For example, when a court must decide
whether a data search for similar stock trades is worth the cost, all it

118. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
119. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
120. The rules and cases on expert witness admissibility expressly rely on this logic. See, e.g.,
Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989) (“For an expert’s
testimony to be admissible . . . , it must be directed to . . . scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge and not to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without
the expert’s help.”).
121. Employment discrimination cases are the paradigmatic example. See sources cited
supra note 1.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (requiring “leave of court” for more than ten depositions);
id. 30(d)(1) (providing that “a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours” absent leave of court).
123. See BONE, supra note 100, at 229 n.36 (noting that to expand discovery past
presumptive limits, courts must assess the value of greater discovery, which “is bound to be
difficult in the absence of precise knowledge of what the discovery will reveal”).
124. POSNER, supra note 100, at 571.
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knows is whether these kinds of searches, in these kinds of cases, are
125
usually fruitful for plaintiffs (or defendants). As when assessing the
size (L) of cases with subjective value, courts assessing probative
value have little other than Professors Sherman and Kinnard’s idea
that “patterns of appropriate discovery in certain cases may emerge”
based on “rules-of-thumb for determining the amount of discovery
126
normally permissible in certain [case] types.” These rules about
particular case types, however, can be fairly indeterminate. In some
“civil rights cases,” for example, “further discovery is unlikely to shed
127
additional light on the issues” ; on the other hand, perhaps such
cases’ complex intent questions require more extensive evidence
128
gathering. The tension between these competing views of discovery
in civil rights cases shows how imperfect such rules of thumb can be,
even if they are the best among the imperfect alternatives available to
judges.
Thus, even the most relevant proportionality factor—probative
value—can be difficult for courts to analyze, especially if they cannot
see the evidence before ruling (such as in determining whether
upcoming deposition testimony will include enough useful content).
As this Section moves on to discuss, it is just as hard for courts to
analyze p, the variable capturing the merit of the case (the probability
that the plaintiff would win at trial), and, disturbingly, most courts do
not even see merit as relevant to discovery decisions.
3. Probability the Claim Has Merit (p): Difficult for Court to
Assess before Seeing All the Evidence and the Parties’ Arguments
about That Evidence.
a. Why Courts Do Not Consider Case Merit in Making Discovery
Decisions: The Conventional Wisdom that Discovery is Unrelated to
Case Merit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created, and
initially interpreted, on a consensus view, in the words of a famous
125. The plaintiff, the party with the burden of proving its opponent’s misconduct, usually is
the one seeking more discovery. Defendants may seek extensive discovery to prove misdeeds by
plaintiffs, see sources cited supra note 90; such a defendant is in a position akin to that of a
plaintiff, seeking evidence to prove its opponent’s misdeeds, which is why this Article takes as
its paradigmatic example plaintiffs seeking evidence to prove allegations of misconduct that
defendants deny.
126. Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 112, at 279.
127. Id.
128. One example of a case that presents a complex intent question is Hollander v.
American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990). See supra note 1.
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article by Professor Robert Cover, that “the procedure available in
our courts of general jurisdiction,” including the federal courts, “is
129
assumed to be largely invariant with substance.” That view of
130
litigation procedure has drawn increasing criticism, beginning with
Professor Cover, and some of the Federal Rules do mandate inquiries
into the merits, though primarily rules governing substantive (rather
than purely procedural) pretrial rulings on the merits, such as motions
131
132
for dismissal,
for summary judgment,
or for preliminary
133
injunctions. But for discovery in particular, it remains received
wisdom that proportionality rulings do not depend on the case merits
(p, the odds the plaintiff would win at trial); rather, the factors
entering into proportionality rulings include case size (L, amount in
controversy and importance of issues) and issue complexity (Δp,
134
probative value).
The proportionality rule and its Advisory
Committee’s note detail various factors for assessing the likely benefit
of requested discovery, none of which relates to case merits; all the
factors relate to case size, probative value, the parties’ resources, and
135
whether the evidence is available elsewhere.
Courts rarely say anything about case merits in deciding
discovery disputes. When courts do discuss case merits in adjudicating
129. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules,
84 YALE L.J. 718, 732 (1975) (recounting in depth, and criticizing, that prevailing view); see also
Bone, supra note 110, at 894–95 (recounting the prevailing view underlying enactment of the
Federal Rules that “procedure was normatively distinct from and subordinate to substantive
law. . . . [so that] the design of a procedural system was mainly a technical exercise in perfecting
administrative machinery . . . enforc[ing] the substantive law (whatever that law might be) . . . .
[because] the values relevant to procedural rulemaking were not substantive in nature”).
130. See, e.g., Bone & Evans, supra note 91, at 1282–83 (“Insofar as the argument assumes
that it is possible to mark a sharp divide between procedure and substance, it ignores decades of
judicial frustration grappling with the procedure/substance dichotomy.”); Cover, supra note 129,
at 732–33 (“It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural needs of a complex
antitrust action . . . and an environmental class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are
sufficiently identical to be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which makes virtually no
distinctions among such cases in terms of available process.”).
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (providing for review of merits at the pleading stage).
132. Id. 56 (providing for review of merits at the pretrial stage).
133. Id. 65 (providing that “likelihood of success” on the merits is a factor in judges’
decisions whether to grant motions for preliminary injunctions).
134. As to L, see supra Part II.B.1. As to p, see supra Part II.B.2.
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (assessing “likely benefit” by “the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues”); id. advisory committee’s
note (listing similar factors and noting that “cases in public policy spheres, such as employment
practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary
amount”).
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discovery disputes, it almost always is to disclaim any consideration of
the merits, as in this classic passage from a case decided soon after the
1938 enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
[D]efendant is really arguing . . . that the issue raised by the plaintiff
is irrelevant, not that the interrogatories are irrelevant to the
issue. . . . Whether or not the plaintiff is right is immaterial at this
stage. . . . [T]o ask the Court to decide the whole case on answers to
interrogatories involves a misconception of the office of discovery
136
procedure.

There are rare exceptions to the rule that courts do not consider
case merit in discovery decisions, but they typically occur in two
circumstances. First, Congress may mandate a sequencing of
discovery and a merits inquiry, most notably as it did in the Private

136. Love v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 8 F.R.D. 583, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1948); see also Carrizosa v.
Stassinos, No. C 05-2280 RMW (RS), 2006 WL 1581953, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006)
(“[P]ropriety of discovery does not turn on one party’s belief that the claims are without
merit. . . . This [discovery] motion . . . does not turn on the merits . . . but on the relevance of the
materials requested to such claims.”); Maher v. Monahan, No. 98 Civ. 2319 (JGK)(MHD), 2000
WL 777877, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2000) (“We need not . . . address the ultimate merits of
plaintiff’s claim in order to assess the immediate discovery dispute.”); Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Curtis, 189 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[P]ermitting discovery and leaving [aside] the
question of the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ case as a matter of law . . . is the way . . . courts handle
such matters. . . . [Plaintiffs] are not required to establish a legally sufficient case . . . as a
condition of securing discovery . . . .”); United States v. Clean Harbors, No. C-89-109-L, 1995
WL 155007, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 21, 1995) (“[T]he motion . . . deals solely with parameters of
discovery and does not touch or address the merits of the case.”); In re Gupta Sec. Litig., No. 941517 FMS (FSL), 1994 WL 675209, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1994) (“In considering whether to
stay discovery pending . . . a motion to dismiss, a court should not weigh the relative merits.”);
In re First Constitution S’holder Litig., 145 F.R.D. 291, 294 (D. Conn. 1991) (deeming case
merits irrelevant to a decision to stay discovery pending dismissal motion and stating that “[t]his
judicial officer has a great uneasiness in reviewing . . . [the] complaint and the pending motion to
dismiss and in second-guessing which one is likely to be the more meritorious”); Chubb
Integrated Sys. v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 59 (D.D.C. 1984) (“[O]n questions of
discovery, typically, courts do not determine the legal sufficiency of claims.”); Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp. v. Ram, 15 F.R.D. 404, 405 (E.D.S.C. 1954) (“Plaintiffs’ objections to the
remaining interrogatories are based upon their contention that the allegations by the
defendants . . . do not constitute a valid defense . . . . but so far as [the court is] aware no motion
has been made by the plaintiffs to strike this defense of the defendants. [The court] know[s] of
no authority that [it] ha[s] to strike such a defense [on its] own motion. The defense, therefore,
until stricken is valid. [The court] cannot say that the interrogatories are not relevant . . . .”);
V.D. Anderson Co. v. Helena Cotton Oil Co., 117 F. Supp. 932, 945 n.9 (E.D. Ark. 1953) (“[I]t
is no objection to an interrogatory that it relates to a defense or claim which is insufficient in
law. It is not ordinarily the function of the court in passing upon objections to interrogatories to
decide ultimate questions.”); Laird v. United Shipyards, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 772, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(“The validity of defenses need not be determined upon a motion to limit an examination
before trial, where the matter sought to be inquired into is relevant . . . .”).
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Securities Litigation Reform Act requirement of staying discovery
138
pending dismissal motions under a heightened pleading standard —
but such a congressional mandate is rare. Second, courts sometimes
analyze whether disputed discovery implicates such a weighty public
interest that it must be disallowed absent a sufficient showing of
139
merit —but this rare exception shows not that courts do consider
case merits on discovery motions, but instead that a strong public
interest can create a sort of privilege against disclosure that only
sufficient case merit can overcome. Sporadic exceptions that prove
the rule aside, the rule against considering case merit on discovery
motions is quite well established and consistently followed.
b. Why Courts Should Consider Case Merit: Optimal Discovery
Depends on Whether a Case is a Close Call. Whether or not the
conventional wisdom is an accurate statement of how courts actually
decide discovery disputes, it is dead wrong as to how courts should
decide them. Accurate cost-benefit analysis of the value of evidence is
impossible without considering case merits, because the benefit of
140
evidence (helping a plaintiff prove a case) is highest when the
plaintiff’s claim has enough merit that the factfinder is permitted, but
not compelled, to rule for the plaintiff. In the lowest-odds cases,
additional evidence has little value because it is unlikely to affect the
outcome, which is why parties can move to dismiss before discovery—
to avoid discovery when, given the lack of merit, “[n]o amount of
141
discovery could change the legal reality [of] plaintiff’s claim.”
137. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101,
109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006)) (“In any private
action arising under this chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the
pendency of any motion to dismiss . . . .”).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4b(1) (requiring that plaintiffs identify each false or misleading
statement and specify why each was false or misleading).
139. Discovery decisions considering case merits tend to feature a high public interest that
discovery would jeopardize, such as a public interest in newsgathering harmed by discovery
from journalists, see, e.g., Apel v. Murphy, 70 F.R.D. 651, 654 (D.R.I. 1976), or in avoiding
publicity that would discourage reports of air accidents, see, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219 (D. Del. 1960).
140. For a discussion of how the same analysis applies to defendants, see supra note 125.
141. Federico v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 378, 386 (2006) (dismissing the case before
discovery for failure to state a claim because of the “legal reality. . . that federal employees who
serve by appointment may not bring contract claims”); see also, e.g., Kloth v. Microsoft Corp.,
444 F.3d 312, 324 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding the same, on a claim that the defendant “deprived
consumers of competitive technology” when the claim of injury from deterred invention of new
technology was “speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial proceeding,” so that
“discovery would not change or inform the nature of the alleged injuries”).
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Conversely, although it is the rare case that is so facially clear-cut that
it requires no discovery at all (although there are such cases, such as a
142
clear breach of a contract to pay a certain sum ), the highest-odds
cases more quickly reach the point in discovery after which additional
143
evidence will be of little use.
Thus, the optimal amount of discovery depends on the odds that
a claim will win: the closer the case is to having fifty-fifty odds, the
more the jury needs additional evidence to help it decide the case, so
more discovery should be allowed. The remainder of this Section
offers some fairly brief economic modeling of this analysis; readers
disinclined to mathematical or economic models can skip those
portions of this Article without any problem, but the economic
models are offered to show how traditional economic cost-benefit
models of litigation could be improved by incorporating the points
144
this Article adds.
Case merit (p) affects the optimal discovery amount because of
the court’s opposing goals: (1) limit discovery cost (CD) and (2) limit
the error cost (CE) of incorrect verdicts. More discovery raises
discovery cost (CD) while lowering error cost (CE). The latter has a
diminishing marginal benefit; each additional piece of evidence likely
is less useful (less helpful at preventing error) than the prior one (for
example, the first deposition is the defendant company’s key
decisionmaker, the second is a key witness, the third is a peripheral
145
witness). The court must choose the discovery amount (Q, quantity)

142. See, e.g., New Rochelle Dodge, Inc. v. Bank of N.Y., 511 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (App. Div.
1987) (granting the plaintiff prediscovery “summary judgment in lieu of complaint” when the
defendant “acknowledged the debt” on retail installment contract); Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. v. Marcovitz, 392 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (App. Div. 1977) (holding the same for debt to a law
firm).
143. This point should not be overstated because a high-odds case quickly can become a
low-odds case if denied sufficient discovery. The only (modest) point here about evidentiary
value in close-call cases versus higher-odds cases is just that although both case types typically
need discovery, the point at which additional evidence proves redundant is likely to come earlier
in the high-odds case.
144. See BONE, supra note 100, at 89 n.63 (noting similarly that readers “whose algebra is a
bit rusty can skip . . . [these] algebraic expressions without any problem”).
145. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1482 (1999) (“[As] more evidence is obtained, the effect of additional evidence . . .
will tend to decrease, especially if the search[] begins . . . with the most probative evidence.”). A
related reason evidence offers diminishing marginal benefits is that “[i]f the searcher cannot
determine in advance which evidence is . . . fruitful, his search procedure will resemble random
sampling, and as the size of a sample grows, the value of additional sampling . . . [is] at a falling
rate.” Id. at 1482–83.
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that minimizes total cost, which is the sum of discovery and error cost
(C = CD + CE). The court’s decision is illustrated by the following
relatively informal model, which is based on the classic incomplete
146
information Cournot duopoly model.
Goal: min C = CD + CE. Explanation:
Q
• Choose the amount of discovery (Q) that minimizes the sum of
error costs and discovery costs.
Where: CD = aQ. Explanation:
• Discovery’s cost (CD) is proportional to its amount (Q) times a
constant (a) reflecting cost per unit discovery.
And where: CE = (b/Q)(p - p2). Explanation:
• The term p-p2 models error risk as highest for close calls (p = 0.5),
lowest when merit is clear (p=0 or p=1).
• Error cost (CE) drops at a declining rate as discovery increases (Q),
as modeled by term b/Q (the constant b reflects evidentiary value
per unit discovery).
Substituting the above expressions for CD and CE into min C = CD +
Q
CE yields
b
2
min C = min aQ + ( /Q)(p-p ).
Q

Q

Optimization conditions: choose Q*, the optimal discovery amount,
to minimize C (more discovery would increase cost more than it
reduces errors, and vice versa):
(1) ∂C

2

∂Q

= 0 and (2) ∂ C

∂Q

2

>0

Calculating Q for condition (1), that is, the Q for which ∂C
∂C

∂Q

=a-

b

=0:

2
(p - p ) = 0

Q

2
Q*= (p − p ) b

on p.

∂Q

a

. Explanation: Optimal discovery (Q*) depends

Calculating the term constituting condition (2):

146. In a Cournot model, two firms comprise a market; facing an inverse demand curve,
each chooses production quantity based on the probability the other has high costs (low output)
or low costs (high output). ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 144
(1992). My model is analogous as to the probability a case has merit. With optimal discovery
rising, and then falling as p increases, I model p as a continuous, not discrete, variable (and thus
use derivatives for optimization calculations). See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 317 (4th ed. 2003) (noting preference for “develop[ing] theory using continuous
variables”).
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= 2b(p-p2)/Q3 > 0.

Explanation: The condition is satisfied because all components of
the term are positive: b and Q are inherently positive, and (p-p2)>0
for all p from 0 to 1.
147

In sum, the optimal discovery amount (Q*) depends on the odds a
claim will win (p). Optimal discovery is highest when the odds are
close to fifty-fifty (the closer p is to 0.5) and lowest when merit level is
more apparent (the closer p is to 0 or 1).
c. Why Courts Cannot Easily Consider Case Merit: In Discovery,
Cases Are in a “Pooling Equilibrium” in which Parties Cannot Signal,
and Courts Cannot Assess, Case Merit Effectively. For courts to make
accurate decisions as to optimal discovery amounts, they must
consider p, case merit—yet that may be the hardest task in a
discovery dispute. This is a problem of decisionmaker difficulty
interpreting information signals (parties’ claims as to case merit), so it
is useful to model the situation with game theory, the branch of
economics that is a “powerful tool for modeling information and
148
studying its economic role.” In game theory terms, a decision (here,
court discovery rulings) must base on some measure of merit (often in
game theory the value of a good for sale, but here the merits of
parties’ claims) that parties try to communicate. But during discovery,
it is hard for courts to tell which cases truly have merit because all the
evidence has not yet been gathered. Even if all the evidence had been
gathered, courts cannot review all of a case’s evidence (essentially
holding a minitrial) just to resolve a discovery dispute. As a result, in
149
discovery, those of low merit often can falsely signal high merit.
With limited potential for effectively communicating merit, the
court’s decision must base on the average merit of all cases in the
pool, such as the pool of all cases arising under the same statute that

147. To reiterate the preceding calculations: Q * =

b

2
(p − p ) .

a
148. H. SCOTT BIERMAN & LUIS FERNANDEZ, GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC
APPLICATIONS § 17.1, at 297 (1993); see also Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1990) (“[T]he theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic
theory.”).
149. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY § 11.1, at 320 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that “signaling costs must differ” between those of
high and low worth “for signaling to be useful”).
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Premising
are neither facially frivolous nor obvious winners.
discovery rulings on such broad, blunt proxies as case type is destined
to yield inaccuracy in many individual cases, but this imperfect
151
“pooling equilibrium,” or ruling the same regardless of case merit,
152
remains courts’ best available strategy. Others have noted how
parties discount each others’ bragging about the merits of their case
153
or about a certain piece of evidence. This Article adds that not only
parties, but also courts deciding discovery disputes, face the same
dilemma of receiving useless signals of merit.
Worse, judges might have an exaggerated (rather than accurate)
perception of the extent to which, in discovery, they must assume all
150. Courts occasionally admit premising their rulings on broad hunches, of questionable
accuracy in any individual case, about case merit based on proxies such as case type. See, e.g., In
re First Constitution S’holder Litig., 145 F.R.D. 291, 293 (D. Conn. 1991) (“Securities fraud
actions are recognized as being particularly vulnerable to strike suits . . . . [T]his action belongs
to a class that is subject to strike suits . . . .”). Most courts, however, deny considering case merit
in discovery decisions. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Courts also might see in the
pleadings an apparent flaw that justifies limiting discovery until a dismissal motion. See, e.g.,
Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 644 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding limited discovery
pending a dismissal motion, given that the complaint seemed highly questionable and a qualified
immunity defense seemed promising).
151. BIERMAN & FERNANDEZ, supra note 148, § 18.2.6, at 337 (“[A] pooling equilibrium
implies the informed player’s actions reveal nothing about what type of player he is.”). The
situation actually is likely a partially pooling equilibrium because some parties can signal merit
effectively, such as with a powerful piece of evidence unearthed early enough to submit to the
court on a discovery motion. See GIBBONS, supra note 146, at 213–18 (discussing partially
pooling equilibria). The pooling diagnosis remains because in many cases the evidence will be
equivocal or disputed, and the court will have trouble sifting through both sides’ opposing
arguments as to case merit, so many cases of varied merit levels will populate the same pool
because they will feature signals (merits arguments) the court cannot distinguish without
undertaking more effort than it typically can devote to a discovery dispute.
152. Alternatively, the situation could be viewed not as a pooling equilibrium in a signaling
game (in which the party making the showing is informed but the party that must respond is
not) but as a screening game (in which the party responding to the showing knows more than
the party making that showing). See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum,
Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 134, 140–42 (2003). This Article’s focus on diagnosing and remedying the signaling
problems that afflict many cases (that in many cases, parties know more than the judge which
claims or defenses have merit) should not be seen as an argument that all cases have signaling
problems. There presumably are cases of close to complete, or at least symmetrically
incomplete, information. Further, not all asymmetric-information cases are best described as
signaling rather than as screening games; presumably there are cases in which the judge must
screen claims and defenses because the judge knows better than the litigants which claims or
defenses have merit—such as cases turning on complex disputed legal interpretations in which
the judge knows best what the judge’s views will be on certain arguments.
153. BONE, supra note 100, at 205 (noting that because “parties have incentives to
misrepresent that they have favorable evidence when they do not . . . [and] verification is not
always possible . . . [recipients] discount the truth of the information disclosed”).

MOSS IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

3/16/2009 3:19:12 PM

LITIGATION DISCOVERY

923

cases are low-merit ones not warranting costly discovery. If the pool
contains more low- than high-merit cases, it is rational for judges to
presume, early in a case, that the case likely has low merit and so does
not deserve costly discovery. Presumably judges change such opinions
as more case information emerges. But as anyone who has argued
politics knows, relevant information may not convince people to
change their initial opinions due to common cognitive biases, such as
154
the confirmation bias (people’s tendency to be “not equally open to
all information, but more open to that which comfortably confirms
155
their views, more inclined to spin disconfirming evidence to fit” )
and the availability bias (the tendency to assume that easy-to-recall
156
events are more likely than they really are ). Thus, judges’ earlystage inability to distinguish good and bad cases may persist even
after they have enough information about a case to separate it from
the pool: “a judge might more easily recall cases where discovery was
abused, leading her to assign an excessively high probability of abuse
in the case before her and therefore choose stricter discovery limits
157
than the case warrants.” Even if judges, experts at evidence analysis
and logical conclusions, are less prone to such biases, there is little
reason to think them immune from these well-documented quirks in
human cognition, especially in light of experimental evidence that
judges make decisions with intuitive shortcuts prone to exactly these
158
biases.
Although ruling the same on all cases in the pool is the best
available judicial strategy, it is merely the best among imperfect
154. P.C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129, 138–39 (1960) (finding that after people make an initial,
premature guess as to a numerical pattern, they skew their interpretation of later data to
preserve that guess).
155. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public Funding for Disability
Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the
ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 208 (1998) (noting the role of confirmation bias in
perpetuating discriminatory stereotypes).
156. See, e.g., DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 119–20 (3d ed. 1990); see also Moss
& Malin, supra note 155, at 207 (noting the role of availability bias in perpetuating
discriminatory stereotypes).
157. Bone, supra note 102, at 1988.
158. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (2007).
[In] our experimental research on judges[,] [w]e provide tests of judges’ general
reasoning skills as well as their decision-making skills in legal contexts. Our results
demonstrate that judges, like others, commonly make judgments intuitively, rather
than reflectively, both generally and in legal contexts.
Id. at 6.
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strategies. In fact, it is an imperfect strategy that yields suboptimal
results. In low-merit cases, ruling identically on all cases yields more
discovery than justified by the need for more evidence to assess case
merit. Ruling identically on all cases yields too little discovery in
close-call cases; it disallows the extensive discovery that is justified
when the case is a close call for the factfinder. In this scenario, the
bad cases are treated too well and the good treated too badly, as in
Professor George Akerlof’s classic economic analysis of used car
markets: due to “asymmetry in available information . . . good cars
and bad cars must still sell at the same price—since it is impossible for
a buyer to tell the difference”; as a result, “bad cars drive out the
159
good because they sell at the same price as good cars.”
As with product decisions, in litigation the bad may come to
drive out the good. If courts allow most cases similar discovery—the
amount appropriate for an average case—bad (weak) cases will take
up too much time and money, whereas good cases lose for inability to
gather enough evidence or may never be filed because they will be
allowed only average-case discovery. The harder it is to dismiss bad
cases quickly or reliably, (a) the more often those bad cases will settle
for a nontrivial amount or (less often) yield a plaintiff’s verdict, and
(b) the more judicial attention those bad cases will take up, at the
expense of the attention the good cases deserve. This is to say that
bad cases will drive out good cases; court dockets and parties’
litigation efforts may be filled with more bad cases and fewer good
cases than they otherwise would have, absent this information
problem in discovery. Consequently, the discovery problem this
Article diagnoses—courts’ inability to separate good and bad cases
until after the discovery that accounts for so much litigation cost—
may be a cause of the widely noted prevalence of frivolous
160
litigation.
Could courts adjudicating discovery disputes undertake the
necessary inquiries into the merits? Problematically, any merits
analysis will be incomplete; it would lack at least some of the evidence
because the analysis would be occurring during discovery and before
the resolution of all discovery disputes. Moreover, even if all the
evidence is in, the information costs of undertaking a merits analysis

159. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970).
160. For views on litigation and discovery excess, see supra notes 81–91 and accompanying
text.
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to decide a discovery dispute is prohibitive; the court and the parties
would have to spend a great deal of time, and the parties a great deal
of money, holding a minitrial presenting and arguing about all the
evidence and any allowable inferences. Thus, a merits analysis is
necessary, but infeasible, for optimally accurate rulings on discovery
disputes.
Under this analysis, the quest for better discovery limits has
disappointed not due to bad decisionmaking or bad rulemaking, as
161
many argue. Typifying arguments blaming rulemaking, Professor
162
Thomas Rowe criticizes as too “vague” to “curb[] cost and excess”
the narrowing of discovery, in the 2000 amendments to Rule 26, from
material relevant to the “subject matter” to material relevant to
163
“claims and defenses.” One judge less charitably depicted “debating
[that] difference . . . [as] the juridical equivalent to debating the
164
number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.” Professor
Henry Noyes likewise faults bad rulemaking and bad judging:
[The] e-discovery amendments are the fourth recent attempt to
contain discovery. The three prior . . . relied on increased judicial
discretion, mistakenly assuming that judges would act to limit
discovery. . . . [H]owever, courts have continued to rely on the
default policy of “liberal discovery.” . . . [T]he good cause standard
is problematic both for the new e-discovery rules and for the existing
165
discovery rules.

Professor Noyes concludes that “[t]he courts’ persistent reliance
on the ‘liberal rules of discovery’ mantra will only be overcome with
express instruction to limit discovery, which is absent from the e166
discovery amendments.”

161. See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules,
21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 71 (2007) (criticizing proportionality and e-discovery rules as too
vague to rein in excess discovery that courts are too unwilling to limit); Redish, supra note 78, at
563–64 (noting that “the rules’ drafters and revisers over the years . . . have failed to fashion a
discovery process that satisfies most people,” and specifically criticizing discovery rules for
lacking more cost shifting or spoliation provisions); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a
Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13,
14 (2001) (criticizing federal rules’ discovery limits as vague and therefore unable to change
judicial decisionmaking).
162. Rowe, supra note 161, at 14.
163. Id.
164. Thompson v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md. 2001).
165. Noyes, supra note 161, at 51–52.
166. Id. at 52.
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This Article, while agreeing that courts’ discovery
decisionmaking is suboptimal, and perhaps not disagreeing that
different rules could help, disagrees as to whether better rules or
better judicial decisionmaking truly could fix the problem. The
relevance to optimal discovery (as this Section discusses) of case
merit, amount in controversy, and evidentiary probative value means
that some sort of “proportionality” inquiry is inevitable; one cannot
evade the relevance of the proportionality considerations. Yet even
with the best of all possible rules and judging, courts and parties
would remain stuck in a pooling equilibrium; judges simply do not
have the necessary information to make optimal decisions about
exactly what discovery to allow. It is a fundamental information
timing problem inherent in the discovery stage of litigation: optimal
discovery depends on the merits, but the merits are knowable only
after discovery. As in the folk song about the hole in the bucket
fixable only with a machine requiring water poured from that
167
bucket, the problem is a classic circularity; the problem prevents the
solution.
III. SOLVING THE POOLING THAT PREVENTS BETTER DISCOVERY
DECISIONS: IN CLOSE CALLS ABOUT COSTLY DISCOVERY,
PRESERVE THE EVIDENCE BUT DELAY THE DISCOVERY UNTIL
AFTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Replacing the Pooling Equilibrium with a Separating Equilibrium
as a Case Progresses
In a pooling equilibrium, decisions are suboptimal because it is
hard to distinguish between the meritorious and the unmeritorious, as
discussed above. More optimal decisions are possible in a separating
equilibrium in which parties are forced to “reveal their types to the
168
previously uninformed” decisionmakers. Courts could make more
accurate discovery decisions if they could better tell case merit,
allowing more discovery in close-call cases that, being neither clear
167. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
168. Ayres, supra note 148, at 1307. Separating equilibria actually may be suboptimal if the
signals have no intrinsic value except as signals of merit (for example, obtaining a certain
educational degree as a signal of work ethic or intellect). In such a separating equilibrium, the
cost of signal acquisition (for example, time and tuition) could exceed the improved ability to
separate those of high and low merit. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON.
355, 364–65 (1973). But this Article addresses forced disclosure of evidence a party wishes to
conceal, so the problem of wasteful acquisition of signals is inapposite.
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winners nor clear losers, warrant more extensive evidence gathering.
But courts cannot separate the close calls from the broader case pool
unless parties can credibly signal merit by citing and asserting the
169
evidence supporting their positions. During discovery, parties have
not yet gathered and marshaled all their evidence, so low-, mid-, and
high-merit cases are hard to distinguish. Due to parties’ inability to
signal merit level convincingly, courts are stuck with a pooling, rather
170
than a separating, equilibrium. The only way out is for courts to
conduct minitrials in which parties argue case merits, detailing and
171
offering interpretations of the evidence, but the information costs
(in time and money) of that endeavor are prohibitive for resolving a
discovery dispute.
A pooling equilibrium may become a separating equilibrium
over time as more information emerges that illustrates distinctions
among the pool—a point noted by game theory analyses of
information problems outside the litigation context, such as analyses
172
173
of information about product quality and corporate corruption.

169. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 96–113 (1988) (discussing how signals can degenerate into cheap talk if listeners are
uninformed and therefore unable to spot false signals); Michal Barzuza, Lemon Signaling in
Cross-Listing 27 (Oct. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1022282 (discussing investor efforts to distinguish “Type L” companies more susceptible to
corruption and “Type H” ones less susceptible and arguing that “[t]here will be a separating
equilibrium [if and only if] Type L firms choose not to mimic Type H firms”); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements 2
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 398, 2002),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=327842 (noting how a pooling equilibrium can be
destabilized if “better” actors can make tangibly different offers).
170. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 725 (7th ed. 2007) (noting
how pooling equilibria occur when those with higher merit find it “difficult to separate
themselves” from those with less).
171. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
172. The classic article is George A. Akerlof’s The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, which notes that in used car markets, “bad cars drive
out the good because they sell at the same price as good cars,” but over time better information
emerges:
After owning a specific car . . . the car owner can form a good idea of the quality . . .
i.e., the owner assigns a new probability . . . that his car is a lemon. This estimate is
more accurate than the original estimate. . . . But good cars and bad cars must still sell
at the same price — since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference . . . .
Akerlof, supra note 159, at 489–90; see also Alan Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure
Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 651,
666–67 (2000) (noting how mandatory disclosure of food nutrition content shifted a market from
partial pooling—nondisclosure by higher-fat dressings that varied greatly, in nutritional terms—
to full separating).
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Pretrial litigation is, at heart, a series of stages at which different
information emerges. The paper pleadings stage, disclosing parties’
allegations, is followed by prediscovery dispositive motions (most
174
commonly motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for
175
jurisdictional failings
or conceivably—but rarely—plaintiffs’
176
motions for judgment on the pleadings ) that disclose some of the
parties’ legal arguments and weed out the cases whose (lack of)
177
merit is clearest; those motions are followed by fact disclosures in
discovery, which in turn are followed by summary judgment motions
that further weed out weak claims, and finally followed by the trial
178
that resolves remaining claims.
In sum, as a case progresses through the pretrial stages, it gets
easier to distinguish it from the pool. This is why, even though most
cases settle, some do not settle until some motion litigation or
discovery; the outcomes of certain pretrial skirmishes, or disclosures
in early-stage discovery (like the initial, key depositions), may allow
179
parties to signal merit more meaningfully than they could earlier. In
this sense, moving from one litigation stage to the next—pleadings,
dismissal motions, discovery, and so forth—is the bearing of the
information costs necessary to separate by merit an initially hard-todistinguish pool of cases.

173. See Barzuza, supra note 169, at 7–10 (discussing how a pooling equilibrium might
become a separating equilibrium if law forces a decision on parties (that is, whether to list stock
on an exchange imposing intrusive regulation) that high- and low-value companies decide
differently, thereby credibly signaling their value).
174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
175. See id. 12(b)(1)–(2).
176. Motions for judgment on the pleadings are rare because “federal courts have followed
a fairly restrictive standard in ruling on motions for judgment on the pleadings.” 5C CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368, at 222
(3d ed. 2004) (collecting cases); see also id. § 1367, at 207–08 (“[J]udgment on the pleadings only
has utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the pleadings
and only questions of law remain . . . .”).
177. To be clear, lack of merit could mean any number of ways that a case could lose,
whether that the allegations were false, that the allegations were true but could not be
supported sufficiently, that the allegations were true but some form of jurisdiction was lacking,
or any other reason.
178. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–14 (2002) (discussing this sequence
of pretrial stages).
179. See BONE, supra note 100, at 90–91; Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New
Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 877 (2007).
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B. Summary Judgment as the Key “Separating” Process that Allows
Courts to Distinguish Cases by Level of Merit (p)
Summary judgment is the critical stage for redressing the case
pooling equilibrium problem. Typically coming at the end of
discovery, summary judgment is the next point, after most discovery
disputes, when the court can meaningfully distinguish among cases. It
is exactly the sort of minitrial—reviewing all the evidence to assess
case merit—needed to decide discovery disputes accurately. In
deciding summary judgment, courts allow to proceed to trial only
180
claims a reasonable jury could decide either way, weeding out both
claims with the lowest probability of merit (summary judgment grants
to defendants) and claims with the highest probability (grants to
plaintiffs). After summary judgment, the only claims left are the close
calls in which additional evidence is most useful; summary judgment
separates those close-call cases from the pool.
Courts are stuck with a low-information pooling equilibrium
until summary judgment, as illustrated by the following model. The
estimated probability that a lawsuit is meritorious varies, as litigation
progresses, based both on how many cases get weeded out of the pool
at each litigation stage and on whether the reason cases are weeded
out is that they lack merit. The following are the variables that
influence estimates of the probability that a lawsuit is meritorious:
let:
d1 = fraction of cases dismissed before discovery (on motions to dismiss)
d2 = fraction dismissed after discovery (on summary judgment motions)
s1 = fraction settling before discovery disputes arise

thus:
d1 + s1 = fraction not reaching the end of discovery or summary judgment
1 - d1 - s1 = fraction reaching the end of discovery (called “Stage II” in this
Part)
d1 + s1 + d2 = fraction not surviving past summary judgment motions
1 - d1 - d2 -s1 = fraction surviving summary judgment and thus going to trial or
settling just before trial (called “Stage III” in this Part).

180. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (allowing summary
judgment only if no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant); Guilbert v. Gardner, 480
F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that summary judgment is denied when the evidence, “in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could decide in
that party’s favor”).
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Some data and theory indicate a roughly fifty-fifty chance that
plaintiffs will prevail in cases that reach trial after surviving
dispositive motions (dismissal and summary judgment) and not
181
182
settling. The fifty-fifty hypothesis draws legitimate criticism, but in
weak form it remains useful: dispositive motions and settlements
weed out many of the strongest and weakest claims, so the pool of
cases reaching trial has a disproportionate share of the close-call
claims. Whether cases reaching trial have 50 percent, 40 percent, or 30
percent odds is immaterial, because the key insight is that whatever
their particular odds, those odds are higher than in the pool of all
filed cases, which includes many cases of little or no merit. Further, at
no stage before immediately pretrial (that is, after summary
judgment) does the court have a meaningful sense of the merits.
Following is a discussion of what information the court has, or
can infer, about case merit at three key stages of the path to trial: first,
at the start of the case, before discovery, motions, or in-litigation
settlement efforts (Stage I); next, after dismissal motions and earlylitigation settlements, including during discovery (Stage II); and next,
after summary judgment motions (Stage III).
1. Stage I—Start of the Case, before Discovery, Motions, or
During-Litigation Settlements. At this early stage, all the court knows
is that the parties’ pleadings allege exactly opposite facts, and that
there are various possible case outcomes: a pretrial finding that the
case lacks sufficient merit, either on a motion to dismiss or on a
181. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 18–19 (1984) (noting that as litigation features fewer trials, “the proportion of
plaintiff victories will approach 50 percent” under certain assumptions, such as that the
“plaintiff and defendant possess information that is on average of equal precision, and if the
application of legal standards is, on the whole, coherent and predictable . . . [and] to the extent
[there is a] cost advantage of settlement over litigation”). Professors Priest and Klein collect
“substantial evidence” for their “selection hypothesis” that cases selected for trial will tend to be
close calls. Id. at 31–53, 55 (recounting the evidence).
182. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 493, 494 (1996) (“[D]ata . . . does not support a tendency toward 50 percent
plaintiff victories.”). Professor Shavell notes that the fifty-fifty hypothesis may fail under certain
information problems or if most lawsuits are meritorious. Id. at 494, 499–500. These conditions
seem likeliest in certain case types, such as those that are especially uncertain, and thus hard to
settle (or dismiss when unmeritorious), because they arise under a new law. See, e.g., Ruth
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA
employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. Of those cases
that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported cases. These results are
worse than results found in comparable areas . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
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summary judgment motion; or that the case is the sort of close call
that will survive dismissal motions; or that the parties will settle the
case. This intuitive sense of the range of possibilities is easily
formalized. The probability that a case is meritorious at Stage I (PI)
depends on the fraction of cases weeded out on dismissal and
summary judgment (d1 and d2, respectively) and weeded out via
settlement (s1), as well as the likelihood a settled case was meritorious
(Ps1):
PI=sum of the fraction of cases with each possible outcome
multiplied by the probability a case with that outcome is meritorious
PI = (0) (d1 +d2) + Ps1 (s1) + (.5) (1 - d1 - d2 - s1) = .5 - s1 (.5-Ps1) - .5(d1+d2)

Accordingly, the probability a case is meritorious at the start of
litigation (PI) is less than 0.5, except under two unlikely scenarios: (1)
there would have to be few enough cases dismissed on motions (that
is, low d1 + d2) that removing good cases from the pool by settlement
dominates the opposite effect of removing weak cases by dismissal,
contrary to (very rough) estimates that about one-third of federal
183
cases are dismissed on motions; and (2) settled cases would have to
be on average highly meritorious (high Ps1), contrary to the (limited)
data indicating that many confidential settlements are for modest
184
sums.
Thus, judges’ likely intuition is that initially, the probability that
a case is meritorious is low (PI < 0.5), but that assessed probability
increases during pretrial processes, eventually reaching 0.5, or at least
some higher level than that of the average case filed, for cases
surviving summary judgment (Stage III). The question is whether the
court’s estimate of case merit rises primarily from filing to the
discovery stage (Stage I to Stage II) due to dismissal motions and

183. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 511–12 (1986) (“[S]ome 35 percent of all federal cases are disposed of by rulings on motions
for dismissal or for summary judgment.” (citing information from the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts)); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern
Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 636 (noting, based on a collection of decades of
government data, that the proportion of cases resolved on “dispositive motions[, including]
dismissals on the pleadings, summary judgments, and similar rulings that end a case . . . has
remained quite constant over fifty years at about one-third of all federal civil cases”). These
estimates are very rough, however, and efforts at more precise estimates, such as the percentage
dismissed on 12(b)(6) motions, have yielded quite a varied range of figures, from 2 percent to 6
percent or higher. See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1754 (1998).
184. See Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 111–12, 117 (2007).
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early settlements, or primarily from discovery to trial (Stage II to
Stage III) as a result of summary judgment motions; as discussed
below, it is primarily the latter.
2. Stage II—After Dismissal Motions and Early Settlements
(Including Settlements during Discovery). At this stage, when most
discovery disputes occur, the court has two pieces of information it
lacked at the start of litigation: (1) the case survived prediscovery
dismissal motions; and (2) it did not settle early. But early dismissals
and settlements, taken together, clarify little about case merit.
Dismissal motions do not weed out all low-merit lawsuits, only the
lawsuits in which the lack of merit is sufficiently clear on paper filings,
given that the Supreme Court has cautioned against granting such
185
motions too readily.
Settlements typically are confidential,
preventing the court from knowing the terms of settlement or looking
186
any further into the merits, so the court knows nothing meaningful
about the merits of settled cases.
The probability that a case is meritorious during discovery, Stage
II (PII) can be estimated by noting that the probability of merit of a
just-filed (Stage I) case is the weighted average of the following
possibilities: (1) that a case survives to reach discovery, Stage II (the
fraction 1 - d1 - s1 of all cases, with PII probability of merit); (2) that a
case loses on a dismissal motion (fraction d1, which by definition has
zero probability of merit); and (3) that a case settles early (fraction s1,
with Ps1 probability of merit):
PI = (PII)(1 - d1 - s1)+(0)(d1)+(Ps1)(s1 )
PII = (PI - Ps1s1) / (1 - d1 - s1 )

185. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Court held that motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim rarely should be granted in employment discrimination suits,
id. at 514–15, one of the most common lawsuit types, see infra note 234 and accompanying text
(discussing employment cases). The Court may have shown more willingness to allow such
dismissals in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), which dismissed an antitrust
complaint that insufficiently alleged conspiracy, id. at 1973–74. Yet Twombly denied abrogating
Swierkiewicz, id., and may be more of a heightened antitrust pleading standard than a major
change to general standards for dismissal motions.
186. See BONE, supra note 100, at 19 (“Empirical research in this area is extremely difficult
to conduct because most lawsuits settle and settlements mask evidence of frivolousness.”);
Moss, supra note 179, at 867, 869 (noting the prevalence of confidentiality clauses in
settlements). The one known study of confidential settlements found that in one federal district,
the median confidential settlement size was $30,000 in employment discrimination and $181,500
in personal injury, cases. Kotkin, supra note 184, at 144 & n.134. But most such settlements were
late in litigation, after discovery or summary judgment, id. at 135, 145–49, so the study sheds
only a little light on the merits of cases that settle early.
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By discovery (Stage II), one knows somewhat, but not much,
more about the probability that a case has merit. Knowing how many
cases lose on motions to dismiss helps: the probability that a case
reaching discovery by surviving pre-discovery motions has merit (PII)
is higher when more cases lose on dismissal motions (that is, high d1),
because weeding out unmeritorious cases leaves the remaining pool
more meritorious. Although the effect of more dismissals (d1) is
knowable, the effect of higher settlement rates (s1) is not, because we
do not know the merits of settled cases:
• If early settling cases are mostly unmeritorious (for example, if
defendants mostly pay small nuisance-value settlements of a few
187
thousand dollars in weak cases ), then early settlement weeds out
weak cases, leaving the remaining pool (Stage II cases) of higher
merit (that is, PII > PI).
• If early settling cases are mostly meritorious (that is, if defendants
pay mostly to avoid liability and incriminating disclosures), then
settlement decreases the average merit of cases in discovery
(Stage II). If the merit of settled cases (Ps1) is high, then as the
fraction of cases that settle (s1) rises, the merit of cases reaching
discovery (PII) falls. With dismissals weeding out the
unmeritorious while settlements weed out the meritorious, one
cannot say which is higher, the average merit of the pool of filed
cases (PI) or the average merit of the pool of cases in discovery
188
(PII).

187. See, e.g., Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, 162 F.3d 975, 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
that the plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties” due to the size of their $2,500 to $5,000
settlements and noting that settlement “for less than the costs of defense is a good working
definition of a nuisance-value settlement, unless . . . the stakes of the case are themselves
small”). See generally Moss, supra note 179, at 899–900 (noting that defendants in some cases
“stick to a ‘nuisance-value’ offer (such as $5000)” (citing Fletcher, 162 F.3d at 976)).
188. With settled case merit unknown, varied settlement frequency has indeterminate
effects; one cannot tell whether increasing settlements leaves the remaining case pool higher or
lower merit:
∂ PII

∂s 1
∂ PII
∂s1

<>0?

=

∂

PI

−

P s1 s 1

1 - d 1 - s1

∂ s1

= (Ps1 (d1-1) + PI) / (1 - d1 - s1 )2
∂ PII
∂s1

> 0?

if Ps1(d1-1) + PI > 0
Ps1 > PI / (1-d1)
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In short, between filing and discovery (Stage I and Stage II),
dismissal motions weed out weak cases while settlements weed out
cases of unclear merit. It seems likely that the dismissal of weak cases
189
dominates the theoretically possible effect of settling strong cases,
which would mean that Stage II cases have higher average merit (PII >
190
PI). But with so little information about settlements, one cannot
make any truly confident statements. Accordingly, courts face much
the same dearth of information about cases in discovery (Stage II)
that they face as to just-filed cases (Stage I).
3. Stage III—After Summary Judgment Motions. At this stage, as
discussed above, theory and data suggest that the remaining cases
have a roughly fifty-fifty probability of merit (that is, PIII = 0.5), or at
least have higher average merit than cases earlier in litigation, such as
191
newly filed cases. With case merit largely unknowable at filing
(Stage I) and during discovery (Stage II), Stage III—after summary
judgment—is the first point in time at which courts meaningfully can
assess case merit, and therefore the first point when cases exist largely
in a separating rather than a pooling equilibrium. It is the stage when
courts finally can know enough about case merit to decide discovery
disputes accurately.
Yet delaying discovery decisions until summary judgment seems
to conjure up the hole-in-the-bucket problem again: summary
judgment should base on all the evidence, so how can evidencegathering decisions wait until summary judgment? As discussed in
Section C, there is room for a narrow but important practice of
making some discovery decisions after summary judgment.
C. The Prescription: In Close Calls, Preserving the Evidence but
Delaying the Discovery until after Summary Judgment
Because summary judgment motions ideally are evaluations of
all the evidence, they typically come after all the evidence is gathered

•

∂ PII
∂s1

> 0 only if Ps1 is higher than PI discounted by the fraction of cases not dismissed.

189. For a discussion of the evidence of high rates of dismissals of weak cases and of the
limited value of settled cases, see supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
191. For a discussion of the Priest-Klein hypothesis and its critics, see supra notes 181–82
and accompanying text.
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192

in discovery. Summary judgment before discovery closes is, and
should be, exceptional because “discovery should precede
consideration of dispositive motions when the facts sought to be
193
discovered are relevant to consideration of the particular motion.”
For this reason, the summary judgment rule provides that if
additional discovery is reasonably available, courts should not grant
summary judgment without that discovery, but instead should “deny
the motion [or] order a continuance to enable . . . other discovery to
194
be undertaken.”
Courts granting summary judgment before
completion of discovery risk reversal, as in Gary Plastic Packaging
195
Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., which
explained why complete discovery should precede a grant of summary
judgment:
While summary judgment is a valuable procedural device . . . it is
also a drastic remedy that cuts off the right to have one’s day in
court. The harshness of the remedy is exacerbated when the trial
court refuses to allow plaintiff to conduct discovery. Discovery
serves important purposes, such as . . . fully disclosing the nature and
scope of the controversy . . . framing the issues involved, and
enabling parties to obtain the factual information needed to prepare
for
trial. . . . [S]ummary
judgment
should
be
sparingly
granted . . . when discovery is incomplete and . . . defendants have
192. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Curtis, 189 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[L]eaving the
question of the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ case as a matter of law to a point after discovery closes is
the way in which the federal courts handle such matters. Therefore, plaintiffs are correct . . . that
they are not required to establish a legally sufficient case . . . of the applicability of [the Federal
Advisory Committee Act] . . . as a condition of securing discovery and that resolution of the
legal issues concerning that applicability is premature until discovery ends.” (emphases added));
Bone & Evans, supra note 91, at 1284 (“[T]he procedural system seems to favor postponing a
serious evidentiary review until after substantial discovery has been completed. Summary
judgment, for example, usually takes place only after the parties have had ample opportunity to
uncover information and evidence.”).
193. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 84 F.R.D. 278, 282 (D. Del. 1979) (citing
Canavan v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 553 F.2d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also United States v.
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1115–16 (D.N.J. 1983) (“[W]here a plaintiff must obtain a good deal of
information from the opposing party, judgment should be withheld until the discovery process
has been completed.” (citing Nat’l Life Ins. v. Solomon, 529 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1975)));
Concord Labs., Inc. v. Concord Med. Ctr., 552 F. Supp. 549, 554 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that if
a case entails “knowledge and intent” issues, “material evidence is almost entirely in the hands
of the defendants, and where plaintiff can establish a fair likelihood that it can obtain material
evidence through discovery, we think it unfair to grant defendants summary judgment until
plaintiff has had a full opportunity”).
194. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).
195. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d
230 (2d Cir. 1985).
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196

exclusive possession of the material facts.

Consequently, there is good reason that “[m]ost courts are reluctant
197
to grant summary judgment prior to the termination of discovery.”
But putting summary judgment after all discovery is just a
commonsense convention, not a rule. “‘[T]here is no requirement in
Rule 56 . . . that summary judgment not be entered until discovery is
198
complete.’” In appropriate cases, courts entertain limited-scope
summary judgment motions after only partial discovery; examples
include motions for summary judgment limited to threshold questions
199
like a governmental defendant’s claim of immunity from suit or a
libel defendant’s assertion that only limited evidence is necessary to
undercut the plaintiff’s required showing that the allegedly libelous
200
statement was false.
In certain cases, some burdensome discovery could be allowed
only after summary judgment. The main import of this suggestion is
not that more discovery often should be delayed. Rather, it is that in a
meritorious case, certain burdensome discovery is regularly denied—
and must be denied because courts cannot tell whether the case is
meritorious (and therefore is deserving of more discovery than usual)
during the pooling equilibrium that exists before summary judgment.

196. Id. at 236 (citations omitted); accord Weiss v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 91 F. App’x 683, 690
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Weiss has not had ample opportunity for discovery[, which] . . . . was stayed
pending resolution of Reebok’s summary judgment motion that was narrowly focused on the
structural aspects [of the disputed shoes] . . . Weiss should be granted the time that all litigants
receive to gather . . . evidence that the accused shoes can perform the claimed functions.”);
Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[The] court should have
allowed full discovery [to] . . . allow[] the Bank a fair opportunity to present all available
material evidence pertinent to its opposition to . . . summary judgment.”).
197. Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1115.
198. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
added) (quoting Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1081 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also Paul
Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1029–30 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[A] plaintiff’s
entitlement to discovery prior to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not unlimited,
and may be cut off when the record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce
the facts needed by plaintiff to withstand . . . summary judgment.”).
199. See, e.g., Moore v. Busby, 92 F. App’x 699, 702 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district
court was permitted to stay discovery pending disposition of the summary judgment motion by
the defendant, a judge, on the threshold question of his immunity from suit as a judge).
200. See, e.g., Living Will Ctr. v. NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc., 857 P.2d 514, 520 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that “[l]imited discovery on the issue of falsity is therefore appropriate”
before summary judgment motion because “discovery pertaining to defendants’ state of
mind . . . is not pertinent to the issue of falsity. . . . [and] the issue of falsity . . . [entails]
production only of several hours of original unedited video and audio tapes and internal
production memoranda and records”), rev’d on other grounds, 879 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1994).
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In such a case, the summary judgment denial is a determination that
the case is one in which more discovery is warranted than in the
broader pool of all cases in discovery; it is a determination that
relatively more discovery is warranted than the court could have
assumed during discovery.
Notably, courts’ existing broad case-management powers over
discovery and summary judgment make a new rule technically
unnecessary. There already is “a great deal of discretionary power in
201
the trial court” as to discovery, including as to “controlling and
202
scheduling of discovery” and “determining the appropriateness and
203
timing of summary adjudication under Rule 56.” Some courts
already order that discovery occur in stages, such as by issuing a
scheduling order at a Rule 16 pretrial conference (which occurs early
in litigation) and requiring a certain order of discovery devices (like
document disclosures before depositions) and discovery topics (like
204
fact discovery before expert witness discovery). Sequencing any
205
discovery after summary judgment, though, remains rare.
More broadly, there has been an increasing trend—away from
deeming all discovery to occur at once, in a single discovery phase of
the lawsuit and toward timing discovery based on the outcome of
certain motions or the outcome of initial limited discovery. For
206
example, by statute (the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ),
207
in securities fraud cases courts presumptively stay discovery pending

201. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 34
(2004) (noting that judges at the trial court level “are permitted to make discretionary rulings
with respect to discovery” and other matters); see also Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward
Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1587–90 (2003) (discussing the procedural discretion
of district courts in case-management activities, including discovery matters).
202. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F).
203. Id. 16(c)(2)(E).
204. See id. 16 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he initial disclosures required by Rule
26(a)(1) will ordinarily have been made before entry of the scheduling order, [and] the timing
and sequence for disclosure of expert testimony and of the witnesses and exhibits to be used at
trial should be tailored to the circumstances of the case and is a matter that should be
considered at the initial scheduling conference.”).
205. See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.
206. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, all
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss . . . .”).
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dismissal motions that face a heightened pleading standard; by
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, courts
adjudicating class actions commonly grant limited discovery prior to
the motion for class certification and the rest of discovery only when
209
and if the motion is granted; and courts facing discovery motions
about costly e-discovery sometimes order sampling of a limited
amount of the data to help determine whether later discovery of the
remainder is warranted. In the securities context, one commentator
has observed that the statutory stay of discovery “credentials suits
210
that survive pretrial motions,” a concept similar to this Article’s
broader point that surviving a dispositive motion serves to separate
out of the pool those lawsuits most deserving of broader discovery.
In short, if a court denies costly discovery when a case is hard to
distinguish from the pool of all cases in discovery (Stage II), it should
reconsider that denial of discovery if the case survives summary
judgment (that is, reaches Stage III). Surviving summary judgment
separates a case from a broader pool (all cases in discovery) into a
narrower one (cases reaching trial). More specifically, a summary
judgment denial means a reasonable jury could decide either way. In
other words, p is roughly 0.5—higher than in most cases, which means
that more evidence is more valuable than in most cases (that is, Δp of
additional evidence is high). The key problem courts face in deciding
discovery disputes is that they would need minitrials to assess case
merit sufficiently; summary judgment is the existing point in litigation
when the court already undertakes that effort. In deciding summary
judgment, the court is bearing the information costs necessary to
switch from a pooling equilibrium (where p and Δp are hard to
discern) to a separating equilibrium (where it is clearer which are

208. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring that plaintiffs identify each false or misleading statement
and specify why each was false or misleading).
209. See, e.g., Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878 (N.D. Iowa 2008)
(“The court limited discovery to class certification issues, and set deadlines for the parties’ briefs
related to class action and collective action certification.”); Hoving v. Transnation Title Ins. Co.,
545 F. Supp. 2d 662, 670–71 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[D]iscovery may commence immediately, but it
shall be limited to class certification issues. Discovery must be relevant to the issues of class
certification, including numerosity, typicality, commonality, adequacy of representation, and the
definition of a proposed class.”); In re Sonus Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 244, 252 (D.
Mass. 2007) (“This case, of course, is not yet at the summary judgment stage, and [the court]
cannot determine the merits of the case based upon the limited discovery that has taken place
for the purposes of class certification.”).
210. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497,
520 (1997).
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high-p, high-Δp cases). Based on this analysis, courts’ efforts to assess
case merit on summary judgment can serve double duty, helping
courts decide discovery disputes that, earlier in litigation, they had
trouble deciding because case merit and evidentiary value was
unclear.
D. The Devil is in the Details: Making Workable the Proposal for
Post–Summary Judgment Revisiting of Discovery the Court Had
Denied Earlier
In proposing a different way for courts to handle nuts-and-bolts
practical matters like discovery disputes, the details matter. This
Section discusses five legitimate concerns about this Article’s
proposal and responds to those concerns by fleshing out how this
proposal best could be implemented.
1. Concern Number One: Summary Judgment May Not Clarify
Case Merits.
A denial of summary judgment does not always mean a case is a close
call; weak cases can survive summary judgment when they are fact
intensive or depend on debatable inferences from the facts.

This Article’s premise is that cases surviving summary judgment
have higher odds of success and are more likely to be the close calls,
than the broader pool of all filed cases. Yet some summary judgment
denials do not indicate such odds. Decisions denying summary
judgment sometimes actually say that the case “barely” survives
211
212
summary judgment, or that it does so despite “weak” evidence.
Further, summary judgment “is not commonly interposed, and even
less frequently granted,” in certain areas of law. For example, in
negligence lawsuits, “the judge and jury each have a specialized

211. E.g., Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“There is no rich mosaic of circumstantial evidence of retaliation in this case, but there is
enough (though maybe barely enough) to preclude summary judgment.”); Smith v. Mattox, 127
F.3d 1416, 1419–20 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the evidence of excessive use of force was
“barely” enough because the “hazy border between permissible and forbidden force is marked
by a multifactored, case-by-case balancing test,” precluding a ruling on the level of force “within
the confines of summary judgment review”).
212. E.g., MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 329 F.3d 986, 1008 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Although the evidence of the financial harm to MetroNet is weak, it is sufficient to withstand
summary judgment.”), rev’d sub nom. MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124 (9th
Cir. 2004); Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 739 F. Supp. 1268, 1293 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (“Plaintiffs’
evidence . . . is weak, but it appears to be just enough to get them past summary judgment.”).
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function”; such cases often turn on pure factual disputes (for
example, drivers disputing who entered an intersection first) or
reasonableness and due care inquiries fuzzy enough that even in cases
that seem weak, it is hard for the court to say no reasonable jury
could find for the plaintiff. The same may hold for other areas of law
featuring similar reasonableness tests like unreasonable use of force
214
by police.
But a party’s ability to avoid summary judgment by citing factual
disputes is less than it once was. Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court
has “signal[ed] to the lower courts that summary judgment can be
relied upon more so than in the past to weed out frivolous lawsuits
and avoid wasteful trials, and the lower courts have responded
215
accordingly.” As one much-cited case noted, courts “cannot resolve
factual disputes that could go to a jury at trial, but weak factual claims
can be weeded out through summary judgment motions,” because the
mere “existence of a triable [fact] issue” is insufficient to avoid
summary judgment; “the triable issue must be evaluated in its factual
context, which suggests that the test for summary judgment is whether
216
sufficient evidence exists in the pre-trial record.” Similarly,
the fact that a summary judgment is difficult to obtain in actions in
which the parties’ states of mind are relevant does not mean that it
will never be granted . . . . [S]ummary judgment has been granted to
defendants in suits involving fraud, conspiracy, and other claims
turning on state of mind when plaintiffs’ allegations were not
217
sufficiently supported.

213. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2729, at 533 (3d ed. 1998).
214. See, e.g., Smith, 127 F.3d at 1419–20 (“[W]e cannot within the confines of summary
judgment review hold the force not obviously unreasonable.”).
215. 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 213, § 2727, at 468–69 (footnotes omitted).
216. Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1988); see also
Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver., L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995) (deeming
the “mere existence of some disputed facts” insufficient, because “the quality and quantity of
the evidence offered to create a question of fact must be adequate to support a jury verdict
[and] if the evidence is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative,’ it may not be adequate
to oppose entry of summary judgment” (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986))).
217. 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 213, § 2730, at 40–43 (footnotes omitted) (collecting
cases); see also Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Cases
involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.”).
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Thus, courts do meaningfully assess case merit on summary
judgment even on claims that are quite fact specific or that turn on
state of mind.
Still, with some weak cases surviving summary judgment, this
Article’s proposal will not be useful in every case surviving summary
judgment. It is unsurprising that this Article’s proposal is imperfect
because its premise is that there is no perfect fix. Judges make
suboptimal discovery decisions not because they are bad at their jobs
or because the rules are badly written, but because of the nature of
the information-timing problem: courts lack sufficient information on
case merit and evidentiary value to make optimal discovery decisions.
When summary judgment denials do not indicate case merit,
judges should not, and will not, view that denial as sufficiently
informative to affect their prior discovery rulings. Such uninformative
summary judgment denials mean that the pooling equilibrium, in
which judges have too little information to make optimal discovery
decisions, will persist until trial, because summary judgment does not
move the case from a pooling equilibrium into a separating
equilibrium consisting mainly of higher-than-average merit close-call
cases warranting more discovery. But the judge will know this; after
all, the judge, having sifted through each party’s evidence and
arguments to assess how a reasonable jury could rule, is well
positioned to know whether the summary judgment denial was or was
not based on the merits of the case.
Consequently, the fact that some summary judgment denials do
not indicate case merit means this proposal will not be useful in all
cases. Importantly, though, it does not create a risk of bad post–
summary judgment discovery grants, because judges will know when
their summary judgment denials indicate enough about case merit to
warrant reconsideration of their denials of discovery.
2. Concern Number Two: Courts Should Use Alternatives Such as
Sampling and Cost Shifting.
When courts hesitate to allow potentially relevant but costly discovery,
they need not postpone it until summary judgment, because they have
two alternatives more in conformity with existing discovery practice:
ordering cost shifting that allows the discovery only if the requesting
party is willing to pay some or all of the cost; or ordering a partial
sampling of high-volume discovery.
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Sampling and cost shifting are useful discovery tools but, as
discussed in this Section, they are not a panacea and do not eliminate
the information-timing problem that makes post–summary judgment
discovery potentially useful.
One tool courts do use is sampling, allowing discovery of a
fraction of the data first, then discovery of the rest of the data if the
218
sample proves to contain promising evidence:
A phased approach will allow the Court to engage in a more
meaningful benefit-burden analysis before determining whether to
require cost-shifting . . . . After Defendant restores a portion of the
back-up tapes . . . Plaintiff will then have the opportunity . . . to
determine if it contains relevant evidence and if additional
restoration of back-up tapes is warranted. . . . [R]estoration of onefourth . . . should be adequate to determine whether the tapes are
219
likely to possess relevant evidence.

Yet sampling is useful only if two conditions both hold: first, the
sample must be much cheaper than all the evidence (which is not true
if the main cost is finding a way to read old data); second, the key
evidence must be likely to be present in a small sample (which is not
true if a plaintiff seeks just one key e-mail, because its absence from a
sample will prove nothing). Sampling is only a limited fix because of
these conditions and because it does not redress the main problem—
courts’ difficulty deciding whether to allow costly discovery before
seeing much evidence.
220
221
Cost shifting, whether under the rules or to a greater degree,
gives courts a wider range of options for costly discovery than “yes,
you can obtain it” and “no, you cannot”—but it is a limited fix that
does not resolve the information-timing problem. To begin with,
requiring requesting parties to pay for responding parties’ production
costs jeopardizes nonwealthy plaintiffs’ ability to serve the important
social function of suing to unearth and redress important violations of

218. For cases requiring sampling of high-volume deleted data, see Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 281–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202
F.R.D. 31, 34–35 (D.D.C. 2001); AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 443–44
(2007).
219. AAB Joint Venture, 75 Fed. Cl. at 443–44 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
220. As to cost-shifting rules, see supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. As to costshifting case law, see infra notes 238–53 and accompanying text.
221. See sources cited supra note 78.
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222

More fundamentally, allowing cost shifting in limited
law.
circumstances does not eliminate courts’ need to make difficult-toimpossible decisions about the value of requested discovery.
That is, even with more cost shifting, courts still would face
information-intensive decisions about which discovery is (1)
sufficiently important that the requesting party should get it without
paying production costs; (2) important enough that the requesting
party could get it by paying production costs; or (3) sufficiently
lacking in value that the requesting party cannot get it even if willing
to pay for it. Such decisions remain intractable in many cases because
(as is this Article’s primary diagnosis about the problem of costly
discovery) courts often lack sufficient information about case value
and evidentiary value to undertake accurate cost-benefit analyses on
discovery disputes.
In sum, both sampling and cost shifting have their place as
important tools that, in some cases, can help courts expand their
options for discovery rulings. Similarly, it is commendable that the
2000 e-discovery amendments to Rule 26 emphasized efforts to
achieve cooperation among the parties in place of judicial resolution.
Most notably, those amendments require that the parties’ out-of223
court discovery planning conference include “any issues about
disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including
224
the form or forms in which it should be produced.” Given the
limited potential of judicial rulings to manage discovery with perfect
accuracy, it makes sense for the rules to encourage parties to obviate
the need for such discovery rulings as much as possible. But although
all of these tools—sampling, cost shifting, and precourt resolution—
could reduce the frequency of the information-timing problem this
Article diagnoses, none of them truly can eliminate it from all cases.
Accordingly, alternative proposals are complements, not substitutes,
for this Article’s proposal.

222. See Hay, supra note 97, at 502 (discussing how discovery helps plaintiffs prove and
redress illegality).
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1)–(3) (requiring parties, in advance of their in-court scheduling
conference, to meet by themselves to try to reach agreement on a discovery plan before court
intervention).
224. Id. 26(f)(3)(C).
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3. Concern Number Three: Judges Might Excessively Deny
Discovery and Grant Summary Judgment
Judges might respond to this proposal by denying more discovery (as
a way out of difficult proportionality decisions) and by granting
summary judgment more often (both to avoid cumbersome post–
summary judgment discovery and because plaintiffs will be less able
to obtain evidence they need to oppose summary judgment).

This concern is real; as has been argued about the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act provisions requiring a stay of
discovery pending dismissal motions facing a heightened pleading
standard, “[t]he lack of discovery will hobble the potentially
meritorious suit from withstanding a test of its pleadings by denying
the plaintiff access to information necessary to specifically plead a
225
violation by the defendant.” For four reasons, however, this concern
should not be overstated.
First, a court using this Article’s proposal to deny too much
discovery risks reversal on appeal. Although courts cannot always
allow all the discovery parties want before summary judgment,
appellate courts do enforce the rule requiring as full discovery as
possible before summary judgment, reversing courts that grant
226
summary judgment after unduly denying discovery. Courts are
aware of this presumption that pre–summary judgment discovery
should be as full as possible; this awareness would not disappear if
courts adopt this Article’s proposal.
Second, this Article does not suggest postponing most e227
discovery. The media focus on the costliest cases, but much ediscovery is modest and should remain part of standard (pre–
summary judgment) discovery. A simple, nontechnical search can
228
respond to a request for all e-mails with certain text; some “deleted”

225. Cox, supra note 210, at 520.
226. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
227. Janet Novack, Control/alt/discover, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 60, 60 (telling how one ediscovery consultant charged over $1 million for a court-ordered search of 50,000 tapes, which
the consultant cast as “blackmail” (by the plaintiff, not the consultant), and a violation of some
“‘gentleman’s agreement’ not to go after each other’s electronic data” among lawyers generally
(quoting John Jessen, President, Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc.)).
228. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 315 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (“[S]imply . . . create a plain language search. . . . [for] ‘header’ information, such as the
date or the name of the sender or . . . the text of the e-mail . . . . UBS personnel could easily run
a search for e-mails containing the words ‘Laura’ or ‘Zubulake.’”).
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e-mails remain easily accessible on company servers; and some
230
backup file restoration is affordable. Even costly discovery like
many deleted files, or “metadata” in fraud cases addressing when a
231
document was created or altered, need not always be delayed
232
because courts can initially allow a partial sample.
Third, the exact impact of this Article’s proposal—more
discovery or less, greater or lesser discovery cost—is hard to predict
because postponing some discovery will create multiple, sometimes
conflicting strategic effects. With some discovery postponed until
after summary judgment, there could be (a) less discovery overall
(because courts could eliminate certain costly discovery for some
cases losing on summary judgment) or more discovery overall
(because cases surviving summary judgment would enjoy especially
intensive discovery), and (b) more discovery disputes (because there
would be arguments over what discovery gets postponed), the same
number of discovery disputes (because arguments over what gets
postponed already reach the courts, as arguments over whether to
allow or disallow the discovery), or fewer discovery disputes (because
postponing certain discovery postpones any follow-up disputes, such
as disputes about the extent of the data production). If there is a net
decrease in discovery cost (the cost of discovery as well as of
discovery disputes), that would decrease settlement incentives, which
would increase the number of cases undergoing costly discovery—
partially countering the decrease in discovery cost. In contrast, if
there is a net increase in discovery cost, that too would have
competing incentive effects: increasing parties’ incentives to settle
early, before much discovery (which would decrease the number of
cases with costly discovery) but also increasing the incentive to file
frivolous lawsuits that defendants would settle to avoid discovery
costs. In short, this (or any other) discovery reform proposal could
229. For example, this author has no technical skills but once recovered many “deleted” emails that remained accessible from university servers in an e-mail account subfolder.
230. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638, 640 (D. Kan. 2006) (rejecting
an argument that e-mails on backup tapes were not readily accessible when the estimated cost
was $3,374.95).
231. See Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 22 (comments of James C. Francis IV, J., United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York) (noting that “metadata” includes
“changes to the document over time [and] who the author of the document is,” as well as when
the computer was used on the document, which may help assess “the authenticity of documents”
and a party’s “intent . . . in drafting” them).
232. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 240, 249 and
accompanying text.
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have varied and dynamic effects—some effects foreseeable but others
not, and some effects in conflict with others. As with any change to a
complex system, there is reason to be cautious and humble in making
predictions as to the ultimate mix of effects.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the sort of costly
discovery that courts likely would postpone under this Article’s
proposal is the sort that courts already deny in many cases.
Consequently, this Article’s main impact would be to give parties a
better chance at costly discovery—just later, after summary judgment.
233
In addition to cases denying relevant discovery due to cost, ediscovery decisions in employment cases (which are 12–14 percent of
234
federal civil cases) show that the best-case scenario for a plaintiff in
even a high-value case may be a court order allowing costly ediscovery only with cost shifting, that is, only if the plaintiff pays an
often prohibitively high share of the defendant’s production costs.
235
Consider Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III). Title
VII (employment discrimination) monetary relief is only lost pay plus
236
capped emotional distress and punitive damages, but Zubulake’s
potential damages “undoubtedly” were “higher than [those in] the
vast majority of Title VII” cases: with millions in lost pay, the plaintiff
claimed damages of roughly $15 to $19 million, and the defendant
237
counterestimated approximately $1.2 million. Though the more
than $165,000 e-discovery cost was “surely not ‘significantly
disproportionate’” to the case value and “weigh[ed] against costshifting,” the court still shifted 25 percent of that cost to the
238
plaintiff, even though the evidence was relevant and the plaintiff
made a “limited and targeted request” for e-mails about her sent to or
239
from five individuals. The defendant initially produced a small
sample, five of ninety-four backup tapes, and “a review of these emails reveal[ed] that they [were] relevant” to Zubulake’s claim of
233. For a collection of cases denying seemingly relevant discovery due to cost, see supra
notes 84–85, 88.
234. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69
MO. L. REV. 365, 369 & n.27 (2004) (noting that such cases “also substantially increased in many
state courts”).
235. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006) (capping emotional distress and punitive damages at
$50,000 to $300,000).
237. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 281, 288 (recounting that Zubulake had earned a $650,000
annual salary as an equities trader at a New York securities firm).
238. Id. at 287–88, 291.
239. Id. at 281–82, 285.
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termination not for performance but due to discrimination by her
supervisor Chapin and others:
[T]hey tell a compelling story of the dysfunctional atmosphere . . . .
[and] Chapin’s behavior. . . . [T]he e-mails contradict testimony
given
by
UBS
employees . . . . An
e-mail
from
Chapin . . . acknowledg[ed] that Zubulake’s “ability to do a good
job . . . is clear,” and that she is “quite capable.” . . . [E]-mail
contains the precise words used by the author. . . . a particularly
240
powerful form of proof at trial . . . as an admission.

The “marginal utility” of the evidence “may be quite high,” but
just “potentially,” because the sample lacked “direct evidence of
241
discrimination” —an oddly high threshold, given the Supreme Court
holding that direct evidence is not necessary to prove
242
discrimination. Faulting the plaintiff for the inability to prove with
certainty that it would find a smoking gun in as-yet-unseen discovery,
the court held that despite the “powerful” admissions in e-mails that
tell a “compelling story,” marginal utility analysis weighed only
243
“slightly against cost-shifting.”
In sum,
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more—75 percent of the $249,000 cost to search backup tapes for
high-relevance evidence “relating to CBRE’s workplace
environment,” including “pornograph[y] . . . distributed electronically
248
(i.e., via e-mail) and displayed on [office] computers.” A “test
search” (sampling) “result[ed] in relevant documents that had not
been produced” earlier—between 1.64 and 6.5 percent of sampled emails were relevant, depending on which party one asks—so the
evidence was “only available through restoring and searching the
249
backup tapes.” Yet the court viewed those statistics negatively:
“marginal utility” was low because the sample “revealed a significant
250
number of unresponsive documents.” To say that finding hundreds
of e-mails required searching thousands, however, is a criticism not of
utility but of cost. Further, Wiginton deemed the case stakes of a class
action under a major remedial federal statute (Title VII) insufficient
to justify the discovery:
Plaintiffs claim that should a class be certified, their class recovery
could extend into the tens of millions of dollars. While the Court
cannot completely accept Plaintiffs’ speculative estimate . . . neither
can it accept that their claims are worthless . . . . Nevertheless,
several hundred thousand dollars for one limited part of discovery is
a substantial amount . . . . Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of
251
cost-shifting.

Even “[t]he importance of the issues at stake . . . [did] not weigh
252
in favor of or against cost-shifting” in Wiginton. Despite the
plaintiffs’ allegations of mass sexual harassment, the Court noted the
parties’ argument that “this factor ‘will only rarely come into play . . .
253
[and that] discrimination in the workplace . . . . is hardly unique.’”
“Publication bias”—the fact that published decisions are just the
tip of the iceberg, and unpublished or unwritten orders may be very
254
different —is especially salient for discovery rulings, which often

248. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 569–70, 577.
249. Id. at 571, 574.
250. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 576.
253. Id. (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
254. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 599 n.163 (2006) (“[E]ven ‘unpublished’ opinions
in the federal courts of appeals are available via Westlaw, whereas the problem of non-
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255

deny discovery in unwritten, unappealable oral orders at court
256
conferences. In one unrecorded court conference in a typical Title
257
VII case, the judge said, “That is insane, insane!” when the
258
plaintiff’s attorney stated plans to depose ten employees (the
number the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deem permissible
259
without court permission ); the judge also said Title VII plaintiffs
“never” get to see the personnel files of “comparators” (those who
got the disputed job), which commonly are part of discovery in Title
260
VII cases.
With courts often grudging about even run-of-the-mill
discovery—ten depositions and relevant personnel files—and with
courts refusing to allow much e-discovery without cost shifting in
even high-value, high-import cases like Zubulake III and Wiginton,
there is little hope for plaintiffs in most cases to obtain costly ediscovery—unless, under this Article’s proposal, the case proves its
merit to the judge by surviving summary judgment. The effect of this
Article’s proposal on most cases would be to allow plaintiffs a second
chance, post–summary judgment, to seek the sort of discovery courts
rarely allow.
Nevertheless, valid concern remains that courts may misuse this
proposal to deny too much discovery. To address that concern, a new
rule, though not required, would be advisable. A rule could make the
intent of this proposal as clear as possible to district courts making
discovery decisions and appellate courts reviewing summary
judgment. A new accompanying Advisory Committee’s note, whether
261
262
to the rules on case management,
discovery,
or summary
263
264
judgment, could clarify similarly with phrasing like the following:

publication creates a bias of unknown direction and strength in district court opinion analysis.”
(emphases added)).
255. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
256. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (providing for court conferences on discovery, trial scheduling,
etc.).
257. Wright v. Sports Auth., Inc., 01 Civ. 2326 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001).
258. The author of this Article was that unfortunate plaintiff’s lawyer.
259. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i).
260. For cases allowing discovery of full personnel files, see, for example, Gatewood v.
Stone Container Corp., 170 F.R.D. 455, 458 (S.D. Iowa 1996); Ladson v. Ulltra East Parking
Corp., 164 F.R.D. 376, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
261. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
262. Id. 26.
263. Id. 56.
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“When a court denies discovery it might have allowed were it clearer
that additional evidence would prove helpful to the factfinder at trial,
the court may reconsider that discovery denial if the case survives
summary judgment.” Whatever the wording of a new rule, the
message is that post–summary judgment discovery should be a vehicle
not mainly for restricting, but primarily for expanding, discovery
when a case proves worthy of more evidence gathering by surviving
summary judgment.
4. Concern Number Four: Judicial Reluctance to Delay Trial to
Reargue a Discovery Dispute.
Judges might be reluctant to allow redundant rearguments of alreadydecided discovery disputes after summary judgment; relitigating
discovery disputes might undesirably delay trial.

To obviate this concern, the procedure for post–summary
judgment reconsideration of discovery can be simpler than a full
motion for reconsideration. One method is an expedited, streamlined
motion: the court could entertain a short reconsideration motion on
any discovery previously denied within one week of denying summary
judgment. An even more streamlined method would be to allow
parties to add to their summary judgment briefings a short discussion
of possible post–summary judgment discovery:
(1) the party opposing summary judgment (typically the plaintiff)
could submit, with its summary judgment opposition filing, a
short (say, three-page) supplement to its summary judgment brief
stating what additional discovery it wants if the case survives
summary judgment;
(2) the party moving for summary judgment (typically the
defendant), in its reply papers, also could submit a concise
supplement arguing against that additional discovery; and
(3) the court, if it denies summary judgment, could include in its
decision an order stating what, if any, additional discovery is
being granted and by when (within so many weeks of the
summary judgment ruling, for example) that discovery must
occur.

264. Although the Judicial Conference has not issued any Advisory Committee’s notes
without a new rule, that policy is not mandated by any law or rule of civil procedure.

MOSS IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

3/16/2009 3:19:12 PM

LITIGATION DISCOVERY

951

More broadly, courts already are creative in managing discovery.
265
They share work between trial and magistrate judges, intersperse
266
limited-scope dispositive motions with partial discovery, and allow
class actions partial discovery limited to discerning the presence or
absence of a true class before adjudicating the question of whether a
267
class should be certified. There is no reason to think courts could
not use these two procedures, or quite likely better ones, to minimize
any possible disruption or redundancy that might result from
reexamining a discovery dispute after summary judgment.
5. Concern Number Five: Loss of Evidence While Discovery is
Delayed.
Evidence might be lost or destroyed between a discovery dispute and
a summary judgment denial: summary judgment might not occur until
weeks or months after a discovery dispute; it can take months just to
brief and argue summary judgment; and it can take months or over a
year for courts to decide summary judgment motions.

In an order denying burdensome discovery, the court should
issue a preservation order stating that the evidence requested should
be preserved until the court decides any summary judgment motions.
The extent of parties’ duties to preserve evidence is a key e-discovery
268
battleground but not a new issue; preservation has been a high265. See Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989) (discussing magistrate judges’ discovery expertise
and arguing that “[a]buse . . . is more likely to occur in a case supervised by a district judge,
whose primary responsibilities lie in trying cases and managing . . . docket[s], than in a case
supervised by a magistrate, whose most challenging and responsible task is, precisely, to manage
discovery in big civil cases”).
266. For a discussion of decisions limiting discovery based on anticipated merits, see supra
note 150 and accompanying text.
267. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 213, § 1796.1, at 57 (“[I]nitially . . . discovery should
be limited to what is necessary for determining whether a proper class action exists.”); see also,
e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 21 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is likely that at least
minimal class discovery must be conducted in order to provide the court with the factual
information necessary to decide whether or not to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class.”).
268. See, e.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring
preservation of data upon notice of relevance to ongoing or impending litigation). Zubulake IV
imposes a broad but not unlimited duty to “suspend [a] routine document retention/destruction
policy” to preserve data:
Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of litigation, preserve . . . every email or electronic document, and every backup tape? . . . Such a rule would cripple
large corporations . . . .
. . . Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine
document retention/destruction policy . . . [with] a “litigation hold” . . . . As a general
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stakes bone of contention among parties for decades in disputes
269
about destroying evidence ranging from body parts to records of
270
Cold War–era CIA programs. Sometimes, courts actually subject a
party who destroyed necessary evidence to an adverse inference that
271
the evidence would have been favorable to the other side.
Notably, any preservation controversies arising out of this
Article’s proposal would be more limited than the usual preservation
disputes. Preservation disputes typically occur early in litigation,
when a party demands preservation of all data on every computer
272
system or data device because it does not yet know what data or
devices will prove relevant, and it does not want to lose data day by
day while, over the first few weeks and months of litigation, it figures
out exactly which data or devices actually are most relevant. Courts
hesitate to make prediscovery preservation orders unlimited in scope

rule, that litigation hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes . . . maintained
solely for the purpose of disaster recovery[], which may continue to be recycled . . .
[per] company[] policy. On the other hand, if backup tapes are accessible (i.e.,
actively used for information retrieval), then such tapes would likely be subject to the
litigation hold.
. . . [However, i]f a company can identify where particular employee documents
are stored on backup tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of “key players” to
the existing or threatened litigation should be preserved if the information contained
on those tapes is not otherwise available. This exception applies to all backup tapes.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
269. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[Defendant’s] act
of discarding the skull flap was, if not intentional, at least seriously negligent.”).
270. See, e.g., Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 116–18, 126 (allowing an adverse inference against a
government defendant when “records were destroyed” by CIA personnel in a case concerning a
CIA program of “surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects”).
271. See Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1244, 1246, 1249 (upholding an adverse inference as to liability,
because although the “[defendant’s] negligent destruction of the skull flap does not lead to a
conclusion that the medical care of Mr. Welsh was negligent. . . . [t]he destruction did . . .
foreseeably prejudice his legal rights”).
272. See, e.g., AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 443 (2007) (holding that
the defendant had “a duty to preserve e-mails from July 2002 to the present, and that
Defendant’s decision to transfer the e-mails to back-up tapes does not exempt Defendant from
its responsibility to produce relevant e-mails”). As one federal judge explained,
the costs of preservation can be exorbitant, not just . . . not recycling back-up tapes,
but . . . implementing a litigation hold, just contacting everybody, finding out where
the information resides . . . . [T]here is inevitably uncertainty about the scope . . . .
Are you going to have to preserve back-up data? How far back are you going to have
to preserve it? What are your employees going to be able to do in terms of deleting
their e-mails?
Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 17 (comments of James C. Francis IV, J., United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York).
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but do issue quite broad orders because of the uncertainty about what
273
eventually will be discoverable.
The sort of preservation order most likely under this Article’s
proposal, however, would be narrow, extending not to all data and all
devices, but just to specific devices with the specific data on which
discovery was denied. In contrast, early in litigation a plaintiff might
seek a preservation order against deleting any files or e-mails,
disposing of computers or personal data devices, or disposing of paper
files with personnel matters. The preservation this proposal would
require would be more limited, covering only the particular evidence
denied in discovery (preserving only e-mails, for example) and only a
limited duration—from the discovery dispute to the time summary
judgment is decided (when the court would either allow the discovery
or end the preservation order).
Further limiting the burden of the necessary preservation is that
this Article does not envision preserving all disputed evidence from
the time of a discovery dispute to the time summary judgment is
decided; preservation is necessary only if the court both (1) sees a real
risk of evidence destruction and (2) sees the particular discovery as
the sort of close call that it should deny to the requesting party in
most cases but perhaps should grant if the case proves its worth by
surviving summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The prevalence of cost-benefit analyses of discovery presents a
mismatch of problem and solution. The main problem with discovery
decisionmaking is not that judges lack the skill to decide what
discovery is insufficiently beneficial or is beneficial but too costly. The
problem is that courts face discovery decisions before they have costeffective access to information needed to make those decisions—
before cases separate from a pooling equilibrium in which there are
many low-merit cases and in which individual case merit is hard to
discern.
273. One judge explained the need for broad preservation orders as follows:
In the paper realm, I can pretty well say, “And thou shalt not destroy any documents
of this type” . . . . In the electronic arena, I am probably going to have to know which
servers the data is likely to reside on, and perhaps who the individuals are whose emails have to be preserved. . . . [Y]ou may well have to preserve inaccessible data
even though you will make an argument later on that you do not have to produce it.
Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 19 (comments of James C. Francis IV, J., United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York).
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A timing problem requires a timing solution, such as this
Article’s proposal for when a court finds a discovery dispute a close
call, typically because the requested evidence is likely to be useful but
too costly to be warranted in the mass of low-merit cases. In such
situations, a court could postpone the discovery until after summary
judgment, the point at which the judge can evaluate the case in depth
and determine if it likely is the sort of close call in which more
evidence gathering than usual is warranted. The proposal aims not to
deny or postpone more discovery, but rather to allow, after summary
judgment, the sort of helpful but costly discovery that courts deny on
a regular basis.
This proposal is not a perfect solution, but that is the point: there
is no perfect solution to the information timing problem. Optimal
discovery depends on case merit, which cannot be assessed until after
discovery. Shifting from a pooling to a separating equilibrium for
discovery rulings requires considering as much evidence as possible—
a prohibitively costly endeavor during discovery, but exactly what
courts do on summary judgment. Postponing certain costly discovery
until summary judgment is an imperfect solution but better than the
prevailing impractical alternative—insisting that rulemakers and
judges make accurate discovery cost-benefit decisions without the
information necessary to do so.
More broadly, economics is getting better at recognizing one of
the defining aspects of litigation—how information emerges over
time. For economics to provide accurate diagnoses and useful
proposals, it must do more than just prescribe a cost-benefit analysis.
Instead, economics must consider critical information-timing matters,
274
whether by modeling cases with options theory,
by noting
275
differences in information disclosure by litigation stage, or—as this
Article attempts with discovery—by modeling litigation disputes
based on how information costs and merit signals change as litigation
progresses.

274. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation:
A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270–71 (2006) (modeling litigation with
“real options theory,” “[a] tool[] applied to the economic analysis of research and development
projects”).
275. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 179, at 877 (analyzing settlement confidentiality based on
information distinctions between settlements reached before and after litigation commences).

